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In 1987, The Miami Herald broke two major national news stories.
The first captivated the public and mass media with lurid details of Dem-
ocratic presidential candidate Gary Hart's sexual meanderings. The sec-
ond revealed that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had drafted a contingency
plan providing for the suspension of the Constitution, the imposition of
martial law, and the appointment of military commanders to head state
and local governments and to detain dissidents and Central American ref-
ugees in the event of a national crisis.1
The revelation that FEMA had drafted such an emergency plan at-
tracted much less public interest than Gary Hart's sexual adventures.
Major newspapers such as The Washington Post and The New York
Times did not even run the FEMA story, and during the Iran-Contra
hearings a question posed to Colonel North about the FEMA plan was
scuttled when Senator Inouye referred it to a closed session.'
The FEMA plan may have failed to arouse attention because we have
grown accustomed to the substantial and steady increase in the scope of
executive emergency power during this century. This growth has taken
numerous forms: the increased imposition of trade and travel restrictions,
the deployment of military personnel alongside civilian law enforcement
officials in waging the war on drugs, and the development of a parallel,
secret government within the executive branch to confront certain foreign
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1. Reagan Advisors Ran Secret Government, Miami Herald, July 5, 1987, at 1, col 1. The plan,
secretly obtained by The Herald, provided for an executive order that former President Reagan would
sign but not make public until a crisis broke. Administration sources deny that the executive order
was ever signed, although some congressional sources believe that President Reagan did sign an execu-
tive order in 1984 that revised national military mobilization measures to deal with civilians in a
national crisis. Id. Attorney General William French Smith voiced his objections to the FEMA plan
in a letter to Robert McFarlane dated August 2, 1984. Id. See also B. BRADLEE, GUTS & GLORY,
THE RISE AND FALL OF OLiVER NORTH 132-34 (1988) (discussing FEMA plan).
2. Miami Herald, July 15, 1987, at 11A, col. 1. Colonel North later denied drawing up or even
knowing of such a plan in response to a question posed by Senator David Boren during the hearings.
Id.
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threats.' These assertions of emergency power have been largely tolerated
because many Americans perceive them as worthy responses to an assault
from abroad by communism, drugs, terrorism and refugees.
Executive reliance on emergency powers to respond to perceived foreign
threats has presented a challenge to the maintenance of constitutional gov-
ernance since the Republic's beginning.4 This Comment analyzes the his-
torical expansion of the executive's emergency power to confront foreign
dangers, from its philosophical roots to the demise of traditional limiting
devices and the subsequent failure of reformist attempts to revive re-
straints. It argues that the undermining of liberal constitutional restraints
on executive emergency power during the twentieth century has been
caused less by legislative failure or by executive arrogance, than by the
transformation of the eighteenth century world and the rise of American
power in global affairs. In response to the changing international context,
this Comment proposes new directions for limiting emergency powers.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF EMERGENCY POWER AND THE
DICHOTOMIES OF LIBERAL THOUGHT
A fundamental tension exists in any constitutional order between the
basic premise of government constrained by law and the perceived need
for unfettered, discretionary power to confront dire emergencies and crisis.
That tension is expressed in various forms. Lincoln asked in 1861
whether a republic must "of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its
own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" 5 The continuing
debate over whether the perceived requirements of national security can
be harmonized with traditional civil liberties and separation of powers,
reflects Lincoln's concerns. Oliver Cromwell articulated the same conflict
when he pithily stated before Parliament, "Necessity hath no law."6
A. Frameworks of Emergency Power: Absolutist, Relativist and Liberal
Three frameworks have been proffered for resolving this tension be-
tween law and necessity. The absolutist perspective contends that the gov-
ernment has no emergency power to deal with crisis other than that spe-
3. See infra notes 178-196 and accompanying text.
4. Executive use of emergency powers to respond to foreign crisis threatens to undermine both
constitutional separation of powers and individual liberties. As James Madison warned almost 200
years ago, "perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions
against danger, real or pretended, from abroad." A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ix
(1973) (quoting Letter from Madison to Jefferson, May 13, 1798); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 8,
at 45 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Safety from external dangers is the most powerful director
of national conduct. Even the most ardent love of liberty will, after time, give way to its dictates.").
5. 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 20 (J. Richardson ed. 1898) (President Lincoln's
Message to Congress, July 4, 1861).
6. Radin, Martial Law & the State of Siege, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 634, 641 (1942) (quoting Oliver
Cromwell).
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cifically provided by the Constitution. As the Supreme Court declared in
Ex Parte Milligan, the Constitution works "equally in war and in
peace," protecting "all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum-
stances."' 7 The absolutist asks rhetorically, is it worth preserving the Con-
stitution and country by trampling upon the basic liberty and freedoms
upon which society is founded?8 The framers' failure to provide for any
general emergency rule or martial law,9 apart from permitting the na-
tional government to call out the militia to suppress insurrections1 ° and
suspend the writ of habeas corpus,1 is mustered as support for the abso-
lutist outlook."
This first perspective suppresses the tension between law and necessity
by denying that such necessity exists in a time of crisis.' Because as a
7. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). Milligan, an Indiana citizen, was tried
and sentenced to death for disloyal activities during the Civil War by a military commission estab-
lished by President Lincoln. After the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
President Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally in creating military commissions to try civilians where
the civil courts were still functioning. The majority opinion written by Justice Davis went even fur-
ther, stating that the rights contained in the Constitution with the exception of the writ of habeas
corpus, could not be suspended by either the President or Congress. Id. at 125. Justice Davis wrote,
"No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the writ of man than that
any of it's [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." Id. at 120. The Court's absolutist decision has been severely criticized by some scholars
and viewed by others as a "political maneuver rather than as a constitutional homily." Roche, Execu-
tive Power & Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W. Po. L.Q. 592, 600-01 (1952).
8. 71 U.S. at 126.
9. European and Latin American constitutions often do contain clauses providing for a general
suspension of rights and liberties in periods of national emergency. See, e.g., A. PEASLEE, 4 CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF NATIONS 907 (3d ed. 1970) (Mexican Constitution, Article 29); Clarke, Emergency
Legislation, Fundamental Rights, and Article 28.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, 12 IRISH JuR. 217
(1977) (discussing Irish Constitution, Article 28); Glas, The New Spanish Constitution, Comments
and Full Text, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 47, 61-62, n.n.70-71 (1979) (discussing the Spanish Con-
stitution, Article 55); see also The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950);
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 4,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1967); see generally Kairys, Ex-
porting Freedom of Speech, in A LEss TIHN PERFECT UNION, ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
THE U.S. CONsTrrTION 387, 395 n.13 (J. Lobel ed. 1988) (collecting sources).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, d. 15.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 2.
12. The Court in Milligan viewed the absence of any provision in the Constitution providing for
a general suspension of rights as indicating that the framers had limited the power of "suspension to
one great right [habeas corpus] and left the rest to remain forever inviolable." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at
126.
13. There are two theoretical justifications for the absolutist view. The first, expressed by Judge
Davis in Milligan, was that the Constitution grants the government sufficient power to preserve its
existence without resorting to suspending rights or extraordinary emergency power. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
at 121. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) (emergency
does not "create" or "increase" power; "Constitution was adopted in period of grave emergency" and
its grants of power were determined in the light of emergency and are not altered by emergency). For
example, the Court in Milligan denied that the safety of our nation ever required denying a citizen
the right to a jury trial during wartime, unless an invasion actually closed the courts of a particular
locality. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126-27. This rationale contains the seeds of a relativist perspective, in
that it implicitly admits that if such a necessity did exist which required suspending rights and guar-
antees, the Constitution would grant the government such power.
The second absolutist justification-raising a basic question of values-argues that even if such
necessity did exist, the preservation of the nation would not be worth the sacrifice of liberty. 71 U.S.
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practical matter such exigencies do arise, the absolutist view tends to be
supplanted by a relativist perspective. In contrast to the absolutist's denial
of the need for emergency power, the second, relativist position argues
that the Constitution is a flexible document that permits the President to
take whatever measures are necessary in crisis situations. As Alexander
Hamilton noted, the constitutional power of the federal government to
provide for national defense "ought to exist without limitation: because it
is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exi-
gencies, or the corresponding extent and variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them."1 Although Hamilton was discussing joint
congressional and executive authority, modern Presidents have used a sim-
ilar argument to justify their own unilateral emergency power. For exam-
ple, President Franklin Roosevelt articulated the view that the President
has the constitutional power to ignore statutory provisions when "neces-
sary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the winning of the
war." 
5
Both the relativist and absolutist views have an underlying philosophi-
cal unity, as both eviscerate the dichotomy between constitutional nor-
malcy and extra-constitutional emergency. The first does so by denying
the need for emergency power; the second does so by interpreting the
Constitution to provide the Executive with the authority to use such ex-
traordinary power.
Liberal constitutionalism sought throughout the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries to resolve the tension between law and necessity
through a third approach, one that preserved the dichotomy between ordi-
nary and emergency power by positing a boundary line separating and
protecting the normal constitutional order from the dark world of crisis
government. Emergency and normal times were counterposed, resulting in
distinct legal regimes. Normalcy permitted a governmental structure based
on separation of powers, respect for civil liberties and the rule of law,
while emergencies required strong executive rule, premised not on law
and respect for civil liberties, but rather on discretion to take a wide range
of actions to preserve the government. Even though necessity required
such action, it was to be feared. As William Pitt noted in 1783, "Necessity
is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of
tyrants; it is the creed of slaves." '
(4 Wall.) at 126.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
15. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND PowERs 250-51 (4th ed. 1957) (quoting
Roosevelt's Speech to Congress, September 7, 1942). Roosevelt also sought to justify his power by
invoking "Congressional acts," however Corwin and other scholars have viewed that justification as a
"vague gesture" where "it is obvious that his principal reliance was, and could only have been, on his
powers under the Constitution." Id.
16. Stavsky, The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 341 (1983)
(quoting William Pitt).
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The attempt to address the tension between law and necessity by de-
marcating separate spheres of emergency versus non-emergency govern-
ance reflects a fundamental philosophical perspective of liberal constitu-
tional thought. Liberal thought premises constitutional democracy upon
the tension between polar opposites: between law and politics, public and
private, state and civil society, universal and particular, reason and desire,
self and other."7 These distinctions attempt to separate the areas of our
existence that can be governed by universal, collectively-derived and rea-
soned rules, from those areas that we want to preserve for particularized
decisionmaking. 8 Liberalism in this sense is not simply a specific political
position, but a world view that seeks to resolve societal tensions by creat-
ing a legally significant dividing line between the two poles of the ten-
sion.1 9 The constitutional restraints on emergency powers explicitly mani-
fest a series of dualities in accordance with the liberal paradigm: crisis and
normalcy, war and peace, constitutional and unconstitutional action.
Two mechanisms serve to demarcate true emergencies from non-
emergency situations in the classical liberal paradigm. The first is the im-
plicit assumption that emergency rule is aberrational.2" Only the gravest
of national emergencies warrant drastic action. The second mechanism
equates the emergency/non-emergency dichotomy with the distinction be-
tween constitutional and unconstitutional action. The Constitution did not
grant the executive any general, inherent, constitutional emergency au-
thority. Rather, eighteenth century leaders and philosophers believed that
the executive should be required knowingly to act illegally or unconstitu-
tionally when utilizing emergency power. For these thinkers, emergency
power was an unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive. Offi-
17. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY & UTOPIA 25-26 (1966) (split between individual and group); K.
MARX, On the Jewish Question in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIE-Y
216 (L. Easton & K. Guddat eds. & trans. 1967) (discussing state/civil society distinction); R. UN-
GER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLITIcs 44-45 (1975) (setting forth series of dichotomies that run through
liberal psychology); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1075 (1980) (liber-
alism sees world as series of complex dualities); Kahn, Reason & Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalismn, 98 YALE L.J. 429, 459-61 (1988) (dichotomy of reason and passion); Kennedy,
The Stages of the Decline of the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982) (liberal
way of thinking involves set of distinctions such as state/society, individual/group, law/policy, public/
private); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 217
(1979) (defining liberalism as splitting universe into two radically opposed imaginary entities).
18. See, e.g., Seidman, Public Principle & Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1019-23 (1987) (describing tension
between universalism and particularism). Various Marxist writers have traced this tension back to a
duality in the nature of commodities in Capitalist society which have both a particular use and a
universal monetary, or exchange, value. E. PASHUtANIS, LAW & MARXISM, A GENERAL THEORY
(1929).
19. Frug, supra note 17, at 1075. As Professor Tribe has noted: "The rule of law in the liberal
state is to a significant degree predicated on possessively individualist assumptions which generate
pressure for the formal conception of fixed rules as solutions to the tension between order and free-
dom." Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARY. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 311 (1975) (citing D.
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973)).
20. Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736,
738 (1978) (Constitution predicated on assumption that crisis is aberrational).
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cials risked censure and even impeachment for engaging in activities justi-
fied solely by the perception of an emergency context. Courts could im-
pose personal liability on those executive officials who undertook
unconstitutional actions, even when such officials acted pursuant to good
faith motivations to defuse a crisis. Subsequent to a court's declaration of
the unlawfulness of an exercise of emergency power, however, Congress
could decide to indemnify the official if it believed the official's actions
really were justified by extreme necessity. This system allowed the execu-
tive to act without creating inherent emergency power under the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, this identification of crisis activity as unlawful and
subject to review reinforced the primary assumption that emergencies
were not the norm.
Classical liberal theory thus divides executive action into two spheres:
normal constitutional conduct, inhabited by law, universal rules and rea-
soned discourse; and a realm where universal rules are inadequate to meet
the particular emergency situation and where law must be replaced by
discretion and politics. The recognition of emergency power evidences an
awareness that those universal rules might not suffice in a particular
emergency situation. The classical liberal answer is not to weaken the
universal rule by providing exceptions for special emergency situations,
because creating either a plethora of legal exceptions or inherent executive
constitutional power to meet every conceivable emergency would under-
mine the distinction between emergency and non-emergency actions.
Rather, liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the normal con-
stitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form
while providing the executive with the power, but not legal authority, to
act in an emergency.
The emergency situation that particularly concerned the framers was
that of war, the "true nurse of executive aggrandizement." 21 Madison's
characterization of war reflects the need for a dichotomy between
war-the most extreme emergency situation-and peacetime constitu-
tional order: "[I]n war . . . [t]he strongest passions and most dangerous
weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity," encircle the
"executive brow." 2 The framers assumed that peace would be the normal
state for the new republic and war, like other emergency power situations,
would be aberrational. 2 The constitutional requirement that Congress
21. J. MADISON, Helvidius No. 4, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
22. Id.
23. See War Powers Legislation Hearings on S. 731, 5.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 59 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1971) (testimony of Richard Morris,
Professor of History, Columbia University). Liberal philosophers of the late eighteenth century as-
sumed that "peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic." M. HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIB-
ERAL CONSCIENCE 25 (1978) (quoting Montesquieu); see also id. at 25-27 (views of Kant, Rousseau,
Condorcet, and Paine that Republic would tend naturally to peace). These philosophical perspectives
were buttressed by the practical political position that the United States would avoid European wars
and advance its commercial interests. See, e.g., Letter from E. Randolph to J. Monroe, June 1, 1795,
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authorize the use of United States armed force against another nation was
designed to ensure that war would truly be an extraordinary measure,2
and thus demarcate the executive's emergency war power from the peace-
time order. The Constitution granted the President only the very limited
emergency power to repel an attack.25 By carefully delineating between
the offensive and defensive use of force, the Constitution created a bound-
ary that executive power could not cross.2" Outside of these two scena-
rios-congressional authorization and repelling an attack-the Executive's
exercise of emergency power to use armed force required the President to
act unconstitutionally.27
in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 706 (W. Lawrie and M. Clark eds. 1883)
(assuming country would avoid war); 4 P. JEssuP, NEUTRALrrY, IT's HISTORY, ECONOMIES AND
LAW: TODAY AND TOMORROW 12 (1934) (quoting Jefferson's statement, "I hope the new world will
fatten on the follies of the old").
24. James Wilson, a key figure at the Constitutional Convention, noted that the vesting of the
power to declare war in Congress was designed to ensure that only a strong interest would involve us
in war. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (1937). See also 4 Id. at 197 (remarks of James Iredell); 1 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES 55 (1826) (power of declaring war vested in legislature because "presumption
is, that nothing short of a strong case" would move Congress to declare war).
25. There has been, of course, intense and voluminous scholarly debate on whether the Constitu-
tion did intend carefully to limit executive power to that of repelling armed attack. Compare infra
note 26 (citing sources interpreting executive's power as limited) with Rogers, Congress, the President
& the War Powers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1194 (1971) (urging broader executive authority than just
repelling attacks); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law, 50 TEx. L. REV. 833 (1972) (asserting that
executive has power unilaterally to use armed force); Rostow, Once More Unto the Breach: The War
Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1986) (same). Abraham Sofaer and others have
explored the practice of early presidents, concluding that in practice, the line between executive and
legislative war-making authority was often blurred. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CON-
STrrTIONAL POWER (1976); see also Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 53
(1971) (canvassing historical record for instances of executive use of force). Sofaer recognizes, how-
ever, that the early presidents did not claim any inherent authority to initiate military actions. A.
SOFAER, supra, at 378. This Comment will not attempt to reargue in detail the debate that has been
substantially elaborated elsewhere.
26. For a discussion of the allocation to the President of the narrow power to defend the country
from attack, see S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 10-14 (1973); E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED
WAR, TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1982); F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, To
CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR, THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (1986); Berger,
War Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 42-44 (1972); Friedman, Waging War
Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 213, 220-23 (1983); Lobel, Covert War & Congressional Authority: Hidden War & Forgot-
ten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1059-60, 1077-78 (1986); Lofgren, War Making Under the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 676 (1972); Van Alstyne, A Requiem
for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1972).
27. At first glance, the mechanism used to draw a line between war and peace appears different
than that used to demarcate emergency from non-emergency power in that the war/peace distinction
allows the Executive some constitutional emergency power to repel an armed attack. Yet, a closer look
at the emergency/non-emergency dichotomy reveals an analogous power. For example, even the abso-
lutist court in Milligan recognized that when the civil courts were not functioning, the Executive had
constitutional emergency power to try civilians by military courts. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 126-27; see supra note 13. Similarly, the Court in Mitchell v. Harmony recognized that
when American property was about to be seized by the enemy during war, executive officials had
constitutional authorization to seize it themselves. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 128, 134 (1851); see infra note
46 and accompanying text. In war or emergency, the Executive has constitutional authority only when
the emergency is physically forced upon the country and there is no option but to respond (i.e., the
courts are closed, the enemy is attacking). Responding is not really a discretionary act when the courts
are closed or the enemy is attacking, it is a physical necessity. Short of that situation, there are other
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Elements of all three frameworks of emergency power-what I have
termed the absolutist, relativist and liberal-have been present throughout
our constitutional history. Yet in the early years of our Nation's existence,
the liberal theory was dominant. Only in the twentieth century has the
relativist perspective come to dominate the government's perspective on
emergency power.
B. The Origin and Early Operation of the Liberal Paradigm of Emer-
gency Power
The roots of the liberal tradition of emergency power can be traced to
John Locke. Locke relied on the English doctrine of prerogative to address
unforeseen "Necessities"-where the "Law-making" power was either
"[t]oo numerous" or "too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution."
In such cases, "it's fit that the laws themselves. . . give way to the execu-
tive Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Govern-
ment . . . that all the Members of the Society are to be preserved."2 The
executive's prerogative was the power to act "according to discretion, for
the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it."' 29 An emergency permitted the disregard of even the "direct
letter of the law.""0 The key attribute of Locke's portrayal of executive
prerogative was the extra-legal power dictated by necessity.
The dominant American constitutional theory of emergency power was
similar to that espoused by Locke. President Thomas Jefferson adhered to
the view that the Constitution carefully limited executive emergency
power and therefore openly acknowledged that certain emergency actions
were unlawful, requiring public ratification by Congress.31 He feared that
the Louisiana Purchase was unconstitutional, but believed that the emer-
gency required the legislature to act and "throw themselves on their coun-
try for doing . . . unauthorized, what we know [the people] would have
done for themselves had they been in a situation to do it." 2 In 1806,
during a congressional recess, a British frigate attacked a United States
ship. Jefferson provided the funds for munitions needed to defend Ameri-
can positions, even though such action exceeded his authority under the
potential emergencies where the Executive is not constitutionally empowered to act, but might act
unconstitutionally if she believes the threat is grave enough. Lobel, supra note 26, at 1059-60,
1077-78 (1986).
28. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 159-60, at 392-93 (P. Laslett ed. 1970).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 164, at 395. Other liberal philosophers echoed Locke's position. Rousseau recognized the
need for an extra-legal "supreme ruler who shall silence all the laws," "if the peril is of such a kind
that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation." J. SMIrrH & 0. CO-ITER,
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISIS 6 (1960). Similarly, John Stuart Mill defended repre-
sentative democracy but refused to condemn a "temporary dictatorship" which would assume absolute
power in cases of extreme necessity. Id. at 7.
31. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 23-25.
32. Id. at 24.
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appropriation laws." He then made a full disclosure to Congress, admit-
ting that, because of the need for strong, swift action, he had acted with-
out a "previous and special sanction by law," and requested congressional
approval. 4 In 1807, upon confronting the Burr conspiracy, Jefferson
again argued that "On great occasions . . . every good officer must be
ready to risk himself in going beyond the strict line of the law, when the
public preservation requires it; his motives will be a justification."3 5
After he left the presidency, Jefferson was asked to comment on
whether there are "not periods when, in free governments, it is necessary
for officers in responsible stations to exercise an authority beyond the
law. .... "38 Jefferson responded:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of neces-
sity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are
of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means.
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does in-
deed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the Con-
stitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk ...
The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the
good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself
on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives."1
Other early leaders took similar positions.3 8 Representative White of
33. Wilmerding, The President and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 323 (1952).
34. 1 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 428 (J. Richardson
ed. 1898). Congress eventually approved Jefferson's conduct, although it recognized that the President
had acted illegally. Jefferson did not attempt to legitimize his orders under the Constitution, he justi-
fied the purchase on the ground of emergency. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs:
Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 221 (1976). Wilmerding, supra note
33, at 322. Sofaer notes that Jefferson, rather than reshape Republican theory to provide for constitu-
tional authority, resorted to the Lockean theory of extra-legal emergency power. A. SOFAER, supra
note 25, at 226-77. Sofaer, however, argues that Jefferson's theory provided the President with more
power than the relativistic Hamiltonian perspective. Id. at 227.
35. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 24. The Burr conspiracy is seen by some, however, as a
dubious use of emergency power. The judicial system later acquitted Burr of treason. Id. at 25.
36. Wilmerding, supra note 33, at 328. (quoting Letter from John B. Colvin to Jefferson, Sept.
14, 1810).
37. Letter from Jefferson to Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810, in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
146, 148-49 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
38. Professor Lucius Wilmerding, who undertook a careful study of the early President's utiliza-
tion of emergency powers, concluded that the early leaders of the Republic generally supported the
theory expressed by Jefferson and White. Wilmerding, supra note 33; see also Dennison, Martial
Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52,
58 (1974) (during debates over Burr Conspiracy, all agreed that "necessity could require a departure
from regular processes, but that the constitution disallowed a deliberate substitution of another legal
system").
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Virginia explained to the First Congress that Virginia's governor had ex-
ceeded his lawful authority in obtaining supplies for the army during the
Revolutionary War. Although the Governor's actions were admittedly ille-
gal, they benefitted the country in time of dire necessity, and therefore he
was afterward indemnified by the legislature. According to White, this
procedure "corresponds with the practice under every limited govern-
ment." 39
General Andrew Jackson's actions in the aftermath of his victory over
the British at New Orleans in 1815 further illustrate the Jeffersonian
theory of emergency power. When Jackson's activities under martial law
were challenged in a court action, his main justification relied on Jeffer-
son's view that necessity "'may in some cases ...justify a departure
from the constitution.' "4o President Madison, relieved that Jackson based
his defense on necessity, observed that even though a suspension of liber-
ties "may be justified by the law of necessity," the commander "cannot
resort to the established law of the land, for the means of vindication."'"
The federal court held Jackson's actions to be unlawful, and it fined him
$1,000. Almost 30 years later, Congress enacted legislation to repay Jack-
son the principal and interest on the fine.42
As Jackson recognized, executive officials who departed from legal
norms in times of war or emergency could be liable for damages to indi-
viduals who suffered injury due to their actions. Courts could sanction
executive officials who violated the law irrespective of the necessity for the
actions. In Little v. Barreme, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the
imposition of individual liability on a naval commander for violation of a
congressional statute, even though he had acted pursuant to a Presidential
Order.4 Congress then decided to indemnify the naval officer, because his
unlawful actions had aided the nation during wartime."
Similarly, in The Apollon, the Court assessed damages against an exec-
39. Wilmerding, supra note 33, at 323 (quoting Representative White).
40. Sofaer, Emergency Power and The Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 233, 245-46
(1981). Jackson arrested a Louisiana legislator named Louaillier, believing such action to be necessary
to prevent a mutiny in his army. When the local Federal judge issued a writ of habeas corpus, he too
was arrested. Louaillier was acquitted by a military court, yet Jackson refused to release him, con-
tending that martial law authorized him to disregard the court's judgment.
After the peace treaty with Britain was ratified, Jackson revoked martial law and released his
prisoners. Contempt proceedings against Jackson were commenced before the very judge he had previ-
ously arrested. Jackson justified his conduct with two somewhat contradictory legal arguments. The
first was that his actions were a constitutional exercise of power pursuant to martial law, an argument
apparently propounded by a legal aide named Abner Duncan. Dennison, supra note 38, at 61-64.
His main defense was that his actions pursuant to martial law were justified by "necessity," since, as
Jackson's other legal aide Edward Livingston informed him, "the general proclaims it [martial law] at
his own risk, and under his responsibility, not only to the government, but to individuals, because it is
a measure unknown to the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. at 61.
41. Sofaer, supra note 40, at 249. Madison erroneously claimed that Jackson based his defense
solely on necessity. Id.
42. Id. at 248-51.
43. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
44. Wilmerding, supra note 33, at 324 n.6.
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utive official for the seizure of a ship and cargo, even though the official
had been motivated by perceived necessity. Justice Story wrote for a unan-
imous court:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the
high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes,
to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief,
by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws.
Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the responsibility
is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the legislature will doubt-
less apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can only look to the
questions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were,
justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable
redress.4
5
Alternatively, the courts enforced the boundary line between executive
emergency power and the constitutional order by adjudicating whether an
emergency did exist. In Mitchell v. Harmony, for instance, the Supreme
Court upheld a damage award against a commander for the improper
seizure of property during the Mexican War, ruling that the question of
whether an emergency had been present was for the jury to determine.'8
While the Mitchell Court did permit a very narrow area of lawful execu-
tive emergency power to seize property during wartime, its main emphasis
was on limiting that power by defining emergency extremely narrowly.4 7
These cases illustrate that review by the courts of executive responses to
foreign threats played an important role in the maintenance of a boundary
between constitutional order and emergency power. In none of these cases
did the Court decide either that the dispute was non-justiciable or that
broad, inherent, executive constitutional powers over war and foreign af-
fairs authorized the acts.'8
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362, 366-67 (1824).
46. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 128, 133-35 (1851).
47. The standard utilized by the Court was that the danger must be "immediate and impending,"
"such as will not admit of delay." 54 U.S. at 134. That the officer honestly believed such emergency
to exist and took the property to promote the public service was deemed insufficient if there were no
reasonable grounds for the officer's belief that the peril was "immediate and menacing." 54 U.S. at
135. This standard for emergency power is similar to the narrow exception given the President to
repel an armed attack-in both cases, action is necessary before the legislative or civil authority can
act.
48. For an excellent discussion of Little v. Barreme, see Glennon, Two Views of Presidential
Foreign Affairs Power. Little v. Barreme or Curtis Wright, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988). In Martin
v. Mott, 24 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 10 (1827), the Supreme Court did refuse to decide whether an emer-
gency existed justifying the President's calling the militia into actual service, thus illustrating that the
Court was, at times, reluctant to adjudicate executive use of emergency power. In Martin, however,
the issue was not the executive's independent power: Congress had clearly authorized the President's
actions, and the issue was whether a soldier could refuse an executive order because he did not believe
an emergency existed. As Professor Christopher May has written in discussing this early period,
"Where the executive had proceeded on its own, the judiciary displayed a remarkable willingness to
analyze the relationship between its conduct and the war emergency." C. MAY, IN THE NAME OF
WAR, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 18 (1989).
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These early examples illustrate an attempt to resolve the conflict be-
tween constitutional governance and emergency power by isolating and
bounding emergency power within narrowly confined, non-constitutional
limits.49 The following elements were required of official emergency ac-
tion in violation of the law within this liberal tradition: the presence of an
extreme emergency threatening the nation, the termination of the unlaw-
ful conduct when the emergency ended, the frank acknowledgment by the
official that he had acted unlawfully, review of the unlawful conduct by
Congress or the courts, and the appropriate implementation of legal reme-
dies and congressional indemnification.
Reliance on the liberal paradigm's premise, that a limitation upon exec-
utive emergency power results from a requirement that the executive act
unconstitutionally, contains certain dangers. The liberal system creates a
precedent for permitting the President to engage in unlawful conduct and
to disrespect the Constitution. Most early leaders of the Republic, how-
ever, generally believed that the problems associated with creating a con-
stitutional basis for the exercise of emergency power outweighed the dan-
gers of allowing the President to act extra-constitutionally and unlawfully
in extreme crisis situations.50 A requirement that the President act uncon-
stitutionally ensures that Congress will have to decide whether or not to
ratify his actions. Moreover, in the liberal paradigm, activity beyond con-
stitutional limits is likely to be both temporary and unusual because of the
American public's respect for the Constitution and suspicion of any ac-
tions which openly contravene it.
Vague constitutional requirements that the President act in the "na-
tional interest" are not constraints on emergency power in the liberal tra-
dition. The Jeffersonian position implicitly argues that reading the Con-
stitution to provide for broad emergency power in the executive is unwise,
49. President Lincoln's justification for his actions taken during the Civil War contained aspects
of both the relativist and liberal perspectives. Reporting to Congress in 1861, he argued that measures
taken to crush the rebellion "whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared
to be a popular demand, and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily
ratify them." 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 20, 24 (J. Richardson ed. 1898) (em-
phasis added). This view suggested that Lincoln believed that he could take unlawful measures dic-
tated by public necessity-a position consistent with that articulated by Madison and Jefferson. See
Hurtgen, The Case for Presidential Prerogative, 17 TOLEDO L. REV. 59, 68 (1975) (interpreting
1861 message as public concession by Lincoln that his measures were partly unconstitutional). In
1864, Lincoln articulated a more relativist perspective that "measures, otherwise unconstitutional,
might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the
preservation of the nation." Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (April 4, 1864), reprinted
in 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 65-66 (J. Nicolay & J. Harp eds. 1894).
50. Justice Jackson's dissent in Korernatsu sounded the same theme. Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 244, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson recognized that military necessity
might often require that "the paramount consideration be that [the government's] measures be success-
ful rather than legal. But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would
I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. . . . A military com-
mander may overstep the bound of constitutionality and it is an incident. But if we review and ap-
prove, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power
of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image." Id. at 244, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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because it would inevitably lead to vast assertions of executive power un-
justified by actual emergencies. As Justice Jackson more recently noted,
"[E]mergency powers . . tend to kindle emergencies."51 In sum, in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a requirement that executive
officials act unconstitutionally to respond to dire emergencies was designed
to ensure that presidents acted only where the weightiest national security
concerns were present.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOMINANT THEORY OF
EMERGENCY POWER
Eighteenth and nineteenth century America's resolution of the tension
between normalcy and necessity by means of two-dimensional line draw-
ing between lawful and extra-constitutional exercises of executive power
was made possible and conditioned by America's place and role in the
world. The possibility of executive resort to unconstitutional conduct dur-
ing a crisis was minimized because a militarily weak and geographically
isolated America largely refrained from actively pursuing confrontations
with threatening, foreign elements. Early United States foreign policy was
designed to avoid, as far as possible, political entanglement in European
affairs. 2 Washington's farewell address, Jefferson's "fear of Europe's
contamination," and Benjamin Rush's advice that "America should be
greatly happy by erecting a barrier against the corruption in morals, gov-
ernment and religion which now pervade all the nations of Europe,"53 all
reflected the widespread conviction among the Founding Fathers that
America was unique and would have to separate itself to avoid the wars
and contamination of the Old World." America could believe that it was
exceptional, "above" the nations of the world, without having constant
crises in reaction to threatening foreign elements, because the nation was
largely living apart from the other nations of the world.55 This isolation-
ism in turn encouraged the American public and political leadership to
51. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
52. Jefferson in his Third Annual Message in 1803 noted, "Separated by a wide ocean from the
nations of Europe, and from the political interests which entangle them, together with products and
wants which render our commerce and friendship useful to them and theirs to us, it cannot be in the
interest if any to assail us, nor ours to distrust them." 3 F. WHARTON, A DIrGEsT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 514 (2d ed. 1887). Washington's farewell address urged that
"the great rule of conduct in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to
have as little political connection as possible." 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 37.
53. H. COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA 25 (1968).
54. Thomas Paine wrote of America as creating "a new method of thinking," while the young
Noah Webster spoke of America as an "independent empire" which "ought to assume a national
character." Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 23; L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 37 (1955). One scholar has
noted that Americans failed to develop an expansive view of martial law, "most probably because they
never faced severe challenges to established authority between 1787 and 1840." Dennison, supra note
38, at 66.
1989] 1397
The Yale Law Journal
take a narrow view of executive emergency and war powers and to seek to
delimit strictly such authority.
In addition, isolationism and separatism 56 were psychologically and
philosophically conducive to the development of a constitutional vision
that emphasized the dichotomy between emergency and non-emergency
power.5 A foreign policy that emphasized the Atlantic Ocean as a means
to cordon off America from danger abroad directly corresponds with a
constitutional policy that seeks to isolate and separate dangers of emer-
gency rule from normal constitutional rule. "Erecting a barrier against the
corruption" of Europe is psychologically connected to erecting constitu-
tional barriers to prevent the corruption of the body politic by means of
war or emergency power.5" The sense of "us versus them" fostered by
separation and isolation led us to view the world in dualities, rendering it
easier to view our own Constitution dualistically.
In the twentieth century, however, the United States turned towards
globalism and international power. The rise of the American empire be-
gan to muddy the boundaries dividing emergency and normal legal orders,
war and peace, totalitarianism and the republic. With the extrusion of
American power abroad, the limitations on presidential power, so care-
fully guarded by the early leaders of the republic, began to erode.
The transformation of the executive's emergency powers began during
the two decades preceding World War I. The United States' assertive ex-
ercise of military power abroad, the increasing use of executive agree-
ments to bypass the treaty procedure, and the unilateral executive use of
force beyond merely protecting American citizens contributed to the evis-
ceration of the limitations on executive power.59 Observers as diverse as
author James Bryce, editor E.L. Bodkin, and military strategist Captain
Alfred Thayor Mahan worried that the Constitution was inconsistent
with these new imperial aspirations.6"
A critical theoretical transformation began to unfold during these early
years of globalism. Inherent presidential emergency power to meet crises
began to emanate from within the Constitution and was no longer an ex-
tra-constitutional assertion of authority. President Theodore Roosevelt ar-
56. L. HARTZ, supra note 55, at 37 (describing American sense of mission as curiously Hebraic
kind of separation).
57. From a broader perspective, the political, cultural and geographic separation and indepen-
dence of America from Europe fed the sense of individual autonomy underlying liberal constitutional-
ism and the separation between public and private.
58. This ethos leads us to respond to fears and perceived crisis, by seeking to remove the alien
danger from our midst. We refuse to perceive the threat as part of our culture and instead seek to
externalize the danger. This sense of distinctiveness brought us the Palmer Raids, the Korematsu case,
and, as Louis Hartz has noted, "made the deportation approach to communism quite instinctive." L.
HARTZ, supra note 55, at 301.
59. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 85-91; Lafeber, The Constitution and U.S. Foreign Policy:
An Interpretation, in A LEss THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.
CONSTITTrnON 221, 229-34 (J. Lobel ed. 1988).
60. Lafeber, supra note 59, at 229-34.
1398 [Vol. 98: 1385
Emergency Power
ticulated the relativist theory of executive power: "Occasionally great na-
tional crises arise which call for immediate and vigorous executive action,
and in such cases it is the duty of the President to act upon the theory that
he is the steward of the people." 1 Roosevelt, unlike Jefferson, grounded
this emergency power on a notion of inherent Constitutional authority,
stating that the President had the "legal right to do whatever the needs of
the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid
him to do it."'6
2
The Supreme Court provided encouragement to the theory of inherent
executive constitutional power to meet exigencies. In 1890, in the course
of ruling that the President had the power to provide the Justices with
personal bodyguards, the Court noted that the President possessed broad,
implied, constitutional powers beyond the execution of treaties and con-
gressional acts.63
The scholarly community also recognized that America's new role re-
quired constitutional changes in the traditional liberal model. For an as-
tute academic such as Woodrow Wilson, the assertion of power abroad
"changed the balance of [constitutional] parts,"" projecting the President
"at the front of government." According to Wilson, the traditional theory
of the Constitution was premised on Newtonian science, a paradigm that
viewed the universe as composed of opposite forces balancing each other to
create symmetry and order.6 5 The metaphor of Newtonian physics under-
scored a dualist, liberal conception of politics and constitutional law.6
Wilson, recognizing the constitutional transformation wrought by rising
American power, substituted Darwin for Newton, elastic adaptation and
modification to environment for formalistic dualities, as the mainspring of
American constitutionalism. Wilson thus provided an intellectual frame-
work for the practical shading of legal boundaries limiting executive
power.
III. THE COLD WAR AND ITS LEGACY OF DECLINING RESTRAINTS
UPON EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS
The process that started at the end of the nineteenth century culminated
after World War II. The assault on the liberal paradigm occurred on
several levels. First, the assumption that non-emergency, peacetime condi-
tions were the normal state of affairs and that emergency was an excep-
61. T. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 464 (1913).
62. Id.
63. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 64 (1890).
64. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1908).
65. Id. at 55. Newton's famous third law of the physical universe, "to every action there is always
opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and
directed to contrary parts," parallels the notion of separation of powers and checks and balances.
66. P. GOLDSTENE, THE COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL EMPIRE: SCIENCE AND REVOLUTION IN THE
TwENIETH CENTURY 11-12 (1977).
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tional condition became invalid. Second, modern Presidents rejected the
Lockean-Jeffersonian perspective on executive use of emergency power in
favor of a view that the Constitution provided for inherent executive
power to meet any perceived emergency. Third, the government concluded
that the legislature ought to provide for emergency power instead of re-
quiring the executive to act without legal authority at the peril of hind-
sight scrutiny. Fourth, the replacement of a formalist intellectual frame-
work with legal realism further supported the judiciary's contribution to
the decline of distinctions created during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
A. A Perpetual State of Emergency, or "There's No Such Thing As
Normal Times Anymore"6
The United States' new role as the world's dominant superpower fed
an obsession with crisis. American dominance altered our notion of na-
tional security. Every challenge to United States hegemony anywhere in
the world began to be perceived as a threat to national security. Those
perceived threats to United States power generated a profound sense of
crisis,6" leading William Fulbright and others to argue that traditional
democratic separation of powers principles had to yield to the need for
strong executive power to meet the new situation and maintain United
States power.69
National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68, issued in April 1950 as
67. Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on the Termination of the National Emergency,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess 83 (1973) [hereinafter National Emergency Hearings] (testimony of Prof. G.
Casper).
68. Arthur Schlesinger writes, "The belief that the world was greatly endangered by communism
had generated a profound conviction of crisis in the U.S.; and the conviction of crisis had generated a
foreign policy that placed the separation of powers prescribed by the American Constitution under
unprecedented, and at times unbearable strain." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 163. Schlesinger
refers to this sense of crisis as bordering on neurosis, as engendering "delusions bred by crisis," a
foreign policy "under the hypnosis of crisis," or "a sense of omnipresent crisis." Id. at 164.
Schlesinger analogizes the United States perspective to the state of mind of the Roman empire:
There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger
or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome's allies; and
if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. . .Rome was always being attacked by
evil-minded neighbors, always fighting for a breathing space.
Id. at 184 (quoting A. SCHUMPTER, IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL CLASSES 51 (1955).
69. "The price of democratic survival in a world of aggressive totalitarianism is to give up some of
the democratic luxuries of the past." Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under
an 18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1961); see S. HOFFMAN, GULLIVER'S TROU-
BLES?, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1968); W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHI-
LOSOPHY 23-24, 29, 48 (1955); see also T. BAILEY, THE MAN IN THE STREET 13 (1948) ("Yielding
some of our democratic control of foreign policy is the price that we may have to pay for greater
physical security."); see generally S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) (perception of crisis
is most important cause of executive assertion of virtually unlimited war power and congressional
acquiescence); Freidman, supra note 26, at 237 (expansion of executive power tied to perception of
crisis). Similarly, the use of CIA covert operation was tied to a perception of crisis. The Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provided for the expenditure of unaudited funds, "for objects of a
confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature." Act of June 20, 1949, § 10(b), 65 Stat. 208 (1949).
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"the first comprehensive statement of a national strategy after World War
II, '1 70 foresaw "an indefinite period of tension and danger."'" 1 In response,
the NSC called for a massive military buildup, and, as President Truman
later wrote, "a great change in our normal peacetime way of doing
things."72 As Truman recognized, the strategy outlined in NSC-68 could
not be implemented without a major crisis. Several months later, the Ko-
rean War provided such a crisis.
On December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a national emer-
gency in response to the developing Korean conflict."3 That national
emergency remained in effect for almost twenty-five years, triggering ex-
traordinary presidential powers to "seize property and commodities, or-
ganize and control production, call to active duty 2.5 million reservists,
assign military forces abroad, seize and control all means of transportation
and communications, restrict travel, institute martial law and in many
other ways, manage every aspect of the lives of all American citizens."',7
That the fighting in Korea had terminated almost ten years earlier did not
prevent President Kennedy from utilizing Truman's emergency proclama-
tion to provide the legal predicate for the embargo against Cuba in
1962."
The assumptions underlying NSC-68 have been repeated frequently, 8
most recently in the Iran-Contra scandal. Justifying his covert aid to the
Nicaraguan contras in defiance of congressional will, Oliver North argued
at the Iran-Contra congressional hearings, "[Tihis nation is at risk in a
dangerous world.""7 The executive had to secretly aid the contras because
70. This was Senator Henry Jackson's characterization of NSC-68. S. AMBROSE, RUSE TO
GLOBALISM 190 (1971); see also LaFeber, supra note 59, at 222 (NSC-68 became the blueprint of
U.S. policy after 1950).
71. S. AMBROSE, supra note 70, at 190. In 1947, three years before NSC-68 was promulgated,
George Kennan published an extremely influential article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 566 (1947), which assumed a continual state of crisis brought about by Soviet expansion-
ism. Id. at 167-68 (1971). Kennan's article was published anonymously.
72. S. AMBROSE, supra note 70, at 189-91.
73. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950).
74. S. REP. No. 1170, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
75. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1984) (citing Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157
(1959-1963)). In addition to the Korean War emergency proclamation, three other declarations of
emergency remained in force until the mid-1970s: President Franklin Roosevelt's declaration of emer-
gency on March 9, 1933, to cope with the banking crisis, Act of Mar. 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 1, 42 Stat.
1 (1933); and the emergencies declared by Richard Nixon in 1970 and 1971 to deal with the Post
Office strike and to implement currency and foreign trade restrictions. Proclamation No. 3,972, 3
C.F.R. 473 (1970); Proclamation No. 4,074, 3 C.F.R. 60 (1971).
76. In 1970, the Nixon Administration was asked whether there was still a need for the emer-
gency powers triggered by Truman's proclamation. The administration responded:
We believe the said authority made available by virtue of the 1950 proclamation has been
needed during the past two decades and is still needed. This continuing need results from the
very acts and threats of aggression which the U.S. and its allies have faced since 1950.
National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at 65 (statement of acting Assistant Secretary of State,
H.G. Torbert, on behalf of the Nixon Administration).
77. Joint Hearings Before the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Oppo-
sition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-100-07 (1987) (testimony of 0. North) [hereinafter Iran-Contra
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"there was a disaster at hand," "we will be overwhelmed," and in less
than twenty years will have to construct a "Berlin-type wall along the
Rio-Grande." 8 According to NSC Adviser John Poindexter, the view
from the White House was that if Nicaragua was lost, Central America
and the Panama Canal would be immediately endangered." Congressman
Henry Hyde and others raised the specter of Neville Chamberlain and
Munich to justify the executive's need to unilaterally aid anti-communist
Nicaraguan rebels. 0
Ironically, the era of our greatest international power and security has
coincided with a mentality of great fear for our own national survival.81
As Professor Gerhard Casper has argued, this sense of emergency "fosters
a mentality which suggests that we live in a garrison state, . . . we
are in a state of alertness at all times. There is no such thing as normal
times any more. '82
Although leaders' interests in manipulating the body politic to support
a massive military buildup and intervention overseas are largely responsi-
ble for the creation of this imagery of crisis,83 structural changes in the
world are also responsible. Most ominous is the development of atomic
weapons, which has brought about pervasive anxiety.8 Politically, "[t]he
nuclear face-off has ushered in an age of the chronic emergency," leading
some commentators to argue that it is no longer reasonable or appropriate
"to distinguish between the emergency powers of the executive and the
Hearings].
78. Id. at 1-150, 1-194, 11-67 (testimony of 0. North).
79. Id. at 1-100-08, 1-222-23. Senator Cohen reflected the atmosphere of emergency permeating
our national life when he commented on the erection of barricades in front of Congress and the White
House, stating, "These stone barricades are not only safeguards for all of us, but they are also symbols
of the dangerous times in which we live...." Id. at 1-255.
80. HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN AND
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OP-
POSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS,
S. REP. No. 216, H. REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 667, 669 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra
Report] (supplemental views of Rep. Hyde).
81. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson said in 1953, "the purpose of our foreign policy is
to maintain and foster an environment in which our national life and individual freedom can survive
and prosper." D. ACHESON, THIS VAST EXTERNAL REALM 19 (1973). Acheson went on to argue
that our national survival was facing a grave danger from the Communist threat. President Kennedy
returned to the imagery of survival when, in his Inaugural address, he asserted that "we shall pay any
price, bear any hardship. . . in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." To TURN THE
TIDE: SELECTION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS 6, 7 (J. Gardner ed. 1962) (quot-
ing President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1961).
82. National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at 83; see also R. RANKIN & W. DALLMAYR,
FREEDOM AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE COLD WAR 2 (1964) (ours is an "age of permanent
crisis"); Miller, supra note 20; Robinson, The Routinization of Crisis Government, 63 YALE REV.
161 (1973).
83. Justice William 0. Douglas once noted that "subconsciously we are not reacting to external
threats, but to a desire to extend our own economic realm and our political zones of action." W.
DOUGLAS, INTERNATIONAL DISSENT: SIX STEPS TOWARD WORLD PEACE 47 (1971); see also N.
CHOMSKY, TURNING THE TIDE 66-72, 85-89 (1985) (describing United States view that we are "a
pitiful, helpless, giant" as a mechanism "undoubtedly believed at some level of consciousness," but
cynically invoked to justify intervention abroad).
84. R. MAY, THE MEANING OF ANXIETY 12 (1977).
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non-emergency policy prerogatives of the legislature."' 5 In a nuclear age
dominated by two superpowers, frequent crises have been substituted for
direct military confrontation between the two great power blocs. 8
The threat of annihilation has coincided with a prevalence of civil wars
that is unique in history. 7 Rather than risk total destruction in direct
confrontation, the major powers have channelled their conflict into proxy,
often covert, wars between different factions within foreign states."8 This
changing character of warfare has led to a blurring of distinctions: be-
tween war and peace, private armies and state agents, transnational and
civil war, civilian and military forces.8 ' A Senate committee noted in
1976, "The recognizable distinctions between declared war and credible
peace have been blurred throughout these [post-war] years by a series of
regional wars and uprisings, in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America,
Europe, and Africa." 90 More recently, the Iran-Contra scandal demon-
strated that in the conduct of covert, national security operations, "[t]he
important line between public and private action has become blurred as
the result of the secret use of private institutions and individuals by intel-
ligence agencies. '
Most importantly, this new era of undeclared war and intervention into
civil wars has led to an almost perpetual state of United States involve-
ment in armed conflict around the world. The nation is legally at peace
with Nicaragua, yet its agents have mined Nicaraguan harbors and
85. Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls Over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The
Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (1988); see also Brezinski,
Forging a Bipartisan and Strategic Approach to Foreign Affairs, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5, 9 (1988)
(nuclear warfare complicates traditional separation of power).
86. Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World, 1964 DAEDALUS 884; see J. SPANIER, GAMES NA-
TIONS PLAY 196 (4th ed. 1981).
87. Laurd, Civil Conflicts, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL REGU-
LATION or CIVIL WARS 8 (E. Laurd ed. 1972). The New York Times has reported that between 1946
and 1959, over 1,200 internal disturbances that could be considered war broke out. Eckstein, Intro-
duction: Toward the Theoretical Study of War, in INTERNAL WAR: PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 3
(H. Eckstein ed. 1964).
88. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL As-
PECTS OF CIVIL STYLE 189 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
89. Harry Truman responsed to the Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
Whatever the six justices of the Supreme Court meant by differing opinions about the constitu-
tional powers of the President, they must always act in a national emergency. We live in an
age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic notes. There are no longer
sharp distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, between military targets and the
sanctuary of civilian areas. Nor can we separate the economic facts from the problems of
defense and security. [The] President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents the
interests of all the people, must be able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the
nation's security.
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 360 (1986) (quoting
2 H. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478 (1956)).
90. S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-8 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM. REP.]. While
undeclared civil warfare was certainly present during the 18th and 19th centuries, the overwhelming
predominance of these forms of warfare in the late twentieth century supports the Committee's
statement.
91. Id. at 16.
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armed, trained, and directed a force attacking Nicaraguan territory. In
these circumstances, the legal term, "peace," has little or no significance.
The new forms of warfare curiously present similarities to the style of
warfare existing in the Middle Ages, an era in which private and public
armies were not distinct, peace and war were not distinct legal regimes,
and intermittent warfare was constant.92
B. Doctrinal Changes
The effect of both the ideology and reality of permanent crisis has dra-
matically transformed the constitutional boundaries between emergency
and non-emergency powers. First, the premise that emergency was a
short, temporary departure from the normal rule of law is no longer oper-
ative.93 Emergency rule has become permanent.
Second, the requirement that the President act in an emergency with an
awareness that her action is unconstitutional has been discarded. Instead,
modern presidents have developed relativistic theories of executive power
premised upon finding broad emergency power within the constitutional
framework. Three key constitutional sources have emerged: the "executive
power" clause,9 the Commander in Chief clause,95 and the executive's
implied power over foreign affairs.
Presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Richard
Nixon have asserted that since Article I limits congressional power to
those powers "herein granted," while Article II's grant of "executive
power" has no such limitation, the President has inherent power to do
either anything necessary to preserve the United States, or, even more
broadly, anything not explicitly forbidden by the Constitution. Even
92. Lobel, The Rise & Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty & Congressional War Powers
in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 6-11 (1983).
93. As Professor Cotter has noted, "What Edwin S. Corwin. . .has called the American concep-
tion of war or emergency ...that it is something arising outside of the normal course of events,
something which is violently and arbitrarily projected across it,. . . will just no longer do as a guide
for emergency government in the United States." National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at
23.
94. U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 1.
95. U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2.
96. See T. ROOSEVELT, supra note 61, at 389. Harry Truman argued, "The Power of the Presi-
dent should be used in the interest of the people and in order to do that the President must use
whatever power the Constitution does not expressly deny him." M. CUNLIFFE, AMERICAN PRESI-
DENTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 343 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting President Truman); see A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 362-66. The Executive's argument to the District Court in the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube case relied on a view of inherent executive emergency power based on the distinction be-
tween Articles I and II. J. SMITH & C. COTrER, supra note 30, at 135 (argument of Assistant
Attorney General Baldridge that Article II of Constitution "did not limit the powers of the Presi-
dent"). For a more recent exposition of the same view, see Cooper, What the Constitution Means By
Executive Power 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 165 (1988) (Assistant United States Attorney General
Charles Cooper's remarks that founders understood executive power as conferring broad authority
beyond mere execution of the laws).
The argument that Article I and Article II powers can be distinguished in this manner is not new,
having been made by Alexander Hamilton as early as 1793 in his Pacificus essays. A. HAMILTON,
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though this "executive power" clause argument has been condemned by
commentators and some courts,9" the executive has continued to rely on it.
This view of inherent executive powers dissolves the distinction between
emergency power and normal lawful power. The abstract concept "execu-
tive power" has no fixed or limited content,9" as Daniel Webster recog-
nized in an eloquent 1835 address to the Senate:
It is true, that the Constitution declares that the executive power
shall be vested in the President; but the first question which then
arises is, What is executive power? What is the degree, and what are
the limitations? Executive power is not a thing so well known, and
so accurately defined, as that the written constitution of a limited
government can be supposed to have conferred it in the lump. What
is executive power? What are its boundaries?99
The Executive has also justified broad emergency power through resort
to the Commander in Chief clause of Article II. The traditional limit of
the Commander in Chief's power to that necessary to repel sudden attack
or resist invasion until Congress has declared war'00 no longer controls
after the Cold War. The Justice Department argued that the President
had the unilateral power to send troops to Vietnam because the interde-
pendence of the twentieth century world meant that all warfare anywhere
in the world might "impinge directly upon the nation's security."' '1
Therefore, modern Presidents have articulated a constitutional power to
send forces into combat whenever they detect threats to national security.
Under this model, the Commander in Chief's powers, in Dean Rusk's
approving words, "are as large as the situation requires."' 2 This vision of
Pacificus No. 1, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 38-40 (H. Syrett ed. 1969). James
Madison, urged on by Secretary of State Jefferson, disputed Hamilton's view of broad executive
power, although he did not directly challenging Hamilton's Article I/Article II distinction. Winterton,
The Concept of Extra-Constitutional Executive Power in Domestic Affairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1, 26-28 (1979) (and sources cited therein). In fact, both Hamilton and Madison recognized that the
Executive's power to promulgate the Neutrality proclamation could be premised on his duty to faith-
fully execute the laws. Id. Professor Corwin argued that the records of the Constitutional Convention
make it clear that the purposes of the first clause of Article I were simply to settle the question of
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title. Id. at 26
(quoting Corwin).
97. Id. at 24-25 & n.160. See M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 124-26 (1977) (Baldridge's argument in Steel Seizure Case so
extreme that it was disowned by President).
98. Winterton, supra note 96, at 27.
99. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 229-30 (1926) (Reynolds, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (quoting from 4 D. WEBSTER, THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 186 (1851)).
100. For the framer's views, see Van Alstyne, supra note 26, at 7-8; Berger, supra note 26, at
42-44; Lofgren, supra note 26, at 676.
101. Office of the Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, The Legality of United States Participation in
the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1965); see also Rogers, supra note 25, at 1197 (ration-
ale behind the concept to repel sudden attacks supports the broader position that "in emergency situa-
tions, the President has the power and the armed responsibility to use force to protect the nation's
security"); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law, supra note 25.
102. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 169. As Republican leader Everett Dirksen told the Sen-
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the Commander in Chief clause merges war and peace, offensive action
and defensive conduct. If any threat to United States security around the
world activates the executive's war powers, then the distinction between
the executive emergency power to repel an attack and congressional power
to authorize the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities loses
significance.10 3
Finally, the executive branch has often relied on the President's generic
and ill-defined power as "the sole organ of foreign affairs," articulated by
dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,104 to justify power
to act in emergency situations. 0 5 Recent administrations have asserted
forcefully that the Constitution limits congressional authority to restrain
the exercise of the President's power as the "sole organ" of foreign affairs
power.106
In sum, as emergency scenarios became the norm, interpretations of the
foreign affairs power, the Commander in Chief clause, and the executive
power clause developed so that the exercise of power necessary to meet the
constant state of crisis was no longer extra-constitutional. The President
no longer has to weigh the need for action against the lack of constitu-
tional authority to act, because the new constitutional flexibility allows the
executive to respond to virtually all exigencies within the constitutional
order.107 Executive legality and illegality have become muddled; former
ate in 1967, his review of Supreme Court precedent yielded "no delimitation on the power of the
Commander in Chief under the Constitution." Id. at 170.
103. The only boundary conceivably limiting executive use of force would be a requirement that
the President articulate some rational or colorable claim that United States national security was
threatened, a requirement that would be met easily in most cases.
104. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). In the course of upholding a broad congressional delegation of
authority to the President to prohibit arms sales to other nations, the Court noted that in addition to
the delegated legislative authority, the President had "plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. . . which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an Act of Congress." 299 U.S. at 319-20. That sweeping statement was unneces-
sary to the Court's relatively narrow upholding of the congressional enactment. See Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (deeming much of the
Court's Curtiss-Wright opinion dictum). Reliance on Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that the Pres-
ident has an exclusive, independent power to conduct foreign affairs is therefore unwarranted. Iran-
Contra Report, supra note 80, at 389-90.
105. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 80, at 388 (various witnesses at Iran-Contra hearing, in-
cluding North and Poindexter, invoked Curtiss-Wright to support broad presidential power).
106. See, e.g., U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelli-
gence: Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1729-34
(1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogorin, Special Counsel to Director of CIA under President Ford);
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 15-19 (1980) (state-
ment of Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA under President Carter) (requirement of prior notifi-
cation of all covert actions would amount to excessive intrusion into executive's constitutional powers).
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 714 (T. Fain, K. Plant & R. Milloy eds. 1977) (quoting Memo-
randum to Laurence Houston, General Counsel to the CIA, on the constitutional and legal basis for
covert activities of the CIA). Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 114-15 (1988) (testimony of Mary Lawton, counsel for
intelligence policy, Justice Department) (requiring 48 hours notice of all covert action, "by tying the
President's hands too rigidly in an area committed to him by the Constitution-the handling of the
foreign affairs of the nation . . . steps over the line of separation of powers").
107. National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at 258 (statement of committee staff director
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President Nixon even argued that our national security concerns now al-
low that when "the President does it, that means that it is not illegal."10'
Flexibility, not strict or mechanical limits, is the constitutional command
in this new age of emergency.
C. The Rise of Legislative Delegation of Emergency Power to the
President
Parallel to the rise of constitutionally-derived executive power to re-
spond to crises was the increasingly vast delegation of emergency power
by Congress to the President. Many legislators thought it preferable to
provide for emergency rule by law instead of either requiring the Presi-
dent to act illegally under the Jeffersonian-liberal model or relying upon
the inherent power of the executive.
Congress sought to provide for executive emergency power by heeding
Machiavelli's warning that a republic ought to provide by law "for every
emergency, [by] having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for
applying it."' 9 According to this outlook, the Constitution's failure to
provide for broad executive emergency power would be best remedied by
legislation providing a framework for emergency rule.
In 1948, Clinton Rossiter's book, Constitutional Dictatorship, outlined
the need for legislation to respond to the new crisis conditions.11 ' Rossiter
presciently concluded that in the atomic age, "[t]he use of constitutional
emergency powers may well become the rule and not the exception." ' 1
Recognizing that the nation's destiny "will rest in the capacity of the
Presidency as an institution of constitutional dictatorship,""' 2 Rossiter ad-
vocated tightening, limiting, and simultaneously strengthening emergency
powers. A "criterion of cardinal importance" was for Congress to adopt a
carefully elaborated scheme and procedure for the suspension of rights
and invocation of executive power in time of emergency. According to
Rossiter,
[A]ll uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organ-
William Miller that in the absence of any objective definition of national emergency, "if the President
says so, it is a national emergency").
108. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1976, at A16, col. 5. According to Nixon, the only "dividing line"
between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct in the area of national security is the President's
judgment, Nixon justified his view by arguing that what is legal or illegal cannot be decided without
reference to the circumstances under which the President concludes the activity is necessary. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1976, at 14, col. 2. Nixon went to incredible lengths to invoke Lincoln's relativistic
view that the Civil War made constitutional certain executive actions that would otherwise have been
unlawful, claiming that the ideological division in the 1960's tore the nation apart in a fashion analo-
gous to the Civil War. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1976, at A16, col. 6.
109. 1 N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DiscouRsEs ch. 34 (L. Walker trans. 1950), quoted in J. SMrrH
& C. COTTER, supra note 30, at 8.
110. C. ROSSITER, CONSTrrTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948).
111. Id. at 297.
112. Id. at 309.
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ization of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitu-
tional or legal requirements. In short, constitutional dictatorship
should be legitimate. It is an axiom of constitutional government that
no official action should ever be taken without a certain minimum of
constitutional or legal sanction. This is a principle no less valid in
time of crisis than under normal conditions."1
Professor Edwin Corwin reiterated Rossiter's theme in the 1950's. 14
For Corwin, the lesson of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"' in
which the Court invalidated President Truman's seizure of steel mills,
was that "just as nature abhors a vacuum, so does an age of emergency.
Let Congress see to it, then, that no such vacuum occurs. The best escape
from presidential autocracy in the age we inhabit is not, in short, judicial
review, which can supply only a vacuum, but timely legislation."' 16
In response to the post-war situation outlined by Rossiter and Corwin,
Congress enacted hundreds of statutes providing for broad emergency
power. By the 1970s, some 470 such statutes existed, delegating power to
the executive over virtually every facet of American life."' Some of the
legislation contained positively draconian provisions. For example, the In-
ternal Security Act of 1950 authorized the President to detain all persons
whom the government had a "reasonable ground" to believe "probably"
would commit or conspire to commit acts of espionage or sabotage." 8
While the detained person was entitled to an administrative hearing and
appeal, the Act did not provide for trial before an Article III court, nor
for the confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. More-
over, in most of the emergency legislation, vague terms'1 9 triggered execu-
113. Id. at 300 (emphasis in original).
114. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 157 (4th ed. 1957); see
Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick without Straw, 53 COL. L. REV. 53, 66 (1953).
115. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding unconstitutional Presi-
dent Truman's seizure of steel mills based on inherent executive emergency power).
116. E. CORWIN, supra note 114, at 157. See Corwin, supra note 114, at 66; see also J. SMITH
& C. COTTER, supra note 30, at 13 (urging provision of legislation sufficient to meet emergency
need).
117. S. REP. No. 1170, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974).
118. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, Title II, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (repealed in
1971). R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT
322-24 (1978). Congress appropriated $775,000 in 1952 to set up six detention camps in Arizona,
Florida, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma and California. Id. at 324. The emergency detention provision of
the Internal Security Act was drawn up with the aid of ACLU attorneys and supported by Senate
liberals such as Hubert Humphrey, Wayne Morse and Paul Douglas. Id. at 366. Indeed, the Act, as
repressive and dangerous as it might seem in retrospect, caused concern to the FBI, which had been
maintaining a list of persons to arrest under a more flexible Justice Department plan that could be
invoked in a time of "threatened invasion" against "dangerous persons," a practice which continued
after passage of the Act. Although the ISA was finally repealed in 1971, forms of emergency detention
have continually reappeared in executive plans, judicial decisions, and most recently in the North-
aided FEMA plan. B. BRADLEE, supra note 1, at 132 (draft executive order proposed by FEMA plan
said to have contained provision for "alien control" and "detention of enemy aliens"); see also United
States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1987) (dictum on constitutionality of aliens' internment
during wartime).
119. National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at 256 (statement of Mr. Miller).
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tive power for unspecified lengths of time. State legislatures followed the
federal example, delegating broad emergency power to governors.120 Ros-
siter's admonitions that emergency powers should be narrowly drawn and
tightly controlled were simply ignored.
While these legislative delegations of emergency authority were often
excessive and uncontrolled, the fundamental problem with the effort to
codify, systematize, and legalize the exercise of executive emergency au-
thority was its attempt to eliminate the tension between law and necessity
that liberal thought presumes. By providing legislation to address every
conceivable emergency situation, emergency power inevitably becomes
routinized, normal, and by definition, lawful.
D. The Court's Role and the Rise of Legal Realism
The judiciary also played an important role in transforming the execu-
tive's emergency power. The Curtiss-Wright Court's dicta about the Pres-
ident's "plenary and exclusive power" over matters connected with foreign
affairs12 lent legitimacy to the doctrine of inherent and unilateral execu-
tive power to conduct foreign affairs.
Furthermore, the Court's wartime detention rulings adopted an ex-
tremely deferential 'reasonableness' standard of review, concluding merely
that the Court could not "reject as unfounded" the military's claim of
necessity.122 Many lower federal courts simply refused to review the valid-
ity of actions taken during a national security emergency. 23 To the extent
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 31-9-1-24 (1987) (Governor given broad emergency powers upon
declaration of emergency where attack on United States is threatened or natural disaster has occurred
within State, threatening welfare of inhabitants (§ 31-9-8)); CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 8555-8668 (West
1980) (Governor given broad emergency powers where attack on the United States or state is probable
(§ 8558(a)), or where she has proclaimed emergency due to disaster or extreme peril to persons and
property, and local authorities request assistance or she finds them unable to cope with emergency
(pursuant to § 8625)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3101-33 (1985) (Governor given broad emergency
powers upon declaration of public disorder, disaster or emergency affecting life, health, property or
public peace (§§ 3125, 3126)); FLA. SAr. ANN. §§ 252.31-.55 (West 1975 & Supp. 1988) (Governor
given broad emergency powers upon declaration that threat that may result in substantial injury to
property or people is imminent (§ 252.36(2)); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 10-4-1-1--28 (Burns 1988) (Gov-
ernor given broad emergency power upon declaration of imminent threat of widespread or severe
damage to life or property (§ 10-4-1-7)); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 29.c.1-20 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988)
(Governor given broad emergency powers upon declaration that people or property are threatened by
either public disorder substantially interfering with public peace (§ 29.c.3) or threatened disaster (§
29.c.6)); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 20-29(d) (McKinney 1982) (Governor given broad powers where she
declares that a threat of widespread or severe damage to life or property may be imminent (§ 28);
chief executives of local areas given broad emergency powers where they have reasonable apprehen-
sion of immediate danger from disaster, noting, catastrophe or similar public emergency (§ 24)); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-146.13-.28 (1986) (Governor given broad emergency powers where she declares
(pursuant to § 44-146.17(7)) threat of condition of sufficient severity and magnitude to require disas-
ter assistance or of "occurrence of such severity or magnitude that governmental action beyond that
contemplated by existing law is required").
121. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See supra note 104.
122. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (standard is whether government has "reasonable ground for believing that the
threat is real). But cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 336 (1946) (Stone, J., concurring).
123. See, e.g., Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1966),
The Yale Law Journal
that the courts reviewed the exercise of emergency powers, they read Con-
gress' delegations broadly and upheld executive authority.12' An example
of this judicial deference is Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.1 25 In upholding the Cuban embargo based on President Truman's
declaration of emergency fifteen years earlier during the Korean War,
Judge Friendly opined:
While the courts will not review a determination so peculiarly
within the province of the chief executive, there can hardly be doubt
as to the existence of an emergency today when thousands of, United
States troops are in action and many more are in readiness around
the globe.12
The perception of a "communist menace" provided a sufficient legal basis
to exercise emergency power towards Cuba.
Even the bright spot in judicial restriction of executive emergency
power-Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer 127 -had the effect of
muddying the line between emergency and non-emergency power. Al-
though advocates of congressional authority look to Youngstown's invali-
dation of the President's seizure of the steel mills as the basis for imposing
limits on executive authority,128 the decision contains the seeds for an ex-
pansion of the President's emergency power.
The legal realist perspective of the concurrences of Justice Jackson and
Justice Frankfurter, rather than the formalism of Justice Black's majority
opinion, now dominates the national security establishment's view of the
Constitution." 9 In contrast to Black's clear conceptual categories of legal
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 125-126; United States v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d
560, 579, 581 n.32 (C.C.P. 1975) (court will not review Presidential judgment that national emer-
gency exists, although it will review whether President's acts are within statutory authority); Beacon
Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-45 (D. Mass. 1986), affd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1987) (whether national emergency as defined by statute existed with respect to Nicaragua in 1984
presents non-justiciable political question); see also Perpich v. United States Department of Defense,
No. 87-5345 (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988) reh'g en banc granted (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1989) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds Library) (the determination of existence of national emergency involves "central political
question").) See generally, C. MAY, supra note 48 (discussing judicial reluctance to adjudicate cases
involving executive emergency powers since 1918).
124. United States v. Yoshida, 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
125. 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
126. Id. at 109.
127. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
128. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1282-85, 1309 (1988) (Youngstown assumes dialogue and general
consensus between Congress and the President about substantive foreign policy ends); Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power. Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L.
REv. 1071, 1119-20 (1985) (Youngstown requires congressional approval of executive action in viola-
tion of international law); Glennon, The War Power Resolution: Sad Record, Dismal Promise, 17
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 657, 661 (1984) (Youngstown supports War Powers Resolution).
129. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Non-
Judicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463, 465-66 (1976). See, e.g., McDougal, Treaties and Congres-
sional Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
212, 221 (1945) (arguing against mechanical or formalistic view of Constitution); Rostow, Response,
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and illegal executive activity, the Jackson and Frankfurter concurrences
contend that foreign affairs powers under the Constitution must be viewed
empirically and fluidly. Presidential powers are "not fixed but fluctu-
ate."' 130 Although Jackson strongly rejects the claim of inherent emergency
presidential power to act in derogation of congressional will, he recog-
nizes, in the legal realist tradition, that the boundary between executive
emergency power and legislative power is fluid in the absence of congres-
sional disapproval.1 31 Frankfurter similarly relies upon Holmes' teaching
that "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. '1 3 2 The Frankfurter concurrence eschews for-
malism as an impermissible "disregard [for] the gloss which life has writ-
ten upon" the text of the Constitution.133 The Jackson/Frankfurter model
is, in effect, an extension of Wilson's exchange of the Newtonian, mechan-
istic model of separation of powers in favor of a Darwinian vision.'3
By emphasizing fluid constitutional arrangements between Congress
and the President instead of the fixed liberal dichotomies bounding execu-
tive power, the legal realist approach to the Constitution and foreign af-
fairs has effectively supported the extension of executive emergency au-
thority.1 35 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have subsequently utilized
Youngstown to uphold broad assertions of executive power.1 6 There has
61 VA. L. REv. 797, 798 (1975) (urging flexibility). Brezinski, supra note 85, at 6 (President
Carter's National Security Adviser argues that Constitution does not hand down "clear cut guidelines
for the process of shaping national security policy," leaving legislative and executive powers "blended"
in "inevitably ... fluid" relationship).
130. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
131. See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICs OF LAW 18, 31
(Kairys ed. 1981). As Professor Mensch wrote, "The prevailing [realist] pattern is to accept as inevi-
table and 'in the nature of things' the absence of vacuum-bounded categories. Id. Instead, the bounda-
ries between categories are portrayed as fluid, or "live," meaning that particular examples often will
occupy a murky middle position. Thus, the collapse of spheres is not total and the goal is to deal
comfortably with a world made up largely of middle positions." Id.
132. 343 U.S. 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
133. 343 U.S. at 610.
134. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
135. For example, Secretary of State William Rogers opposed the War Powers Resolution as
unconstitutional, because "it would attempt to fix in detail," or "freeze" the allocation of power be-
tween the President and Congress. S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973). See also Meese,
Constitutional Fidelity and Foreign Affairs, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 223, 224 (1988) (arguing that
ambiguity regarding limits of congressional versus executive authority makes struggle to define these
limits "more political than constitutional"). Advocates of a forceful assertation of United States power
abroad have also eschewed the strict, formal rules restraining the use of force contained in the U.N.
Charter in favor of a more fluid, "realistic" perspective. As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick argued in
defending the United States invasion of Grenada, "the prohibitions against the use of force in the
U.N. Charter are contextual, not absolute." Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Gre-
nada's Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 395, 418 (1989).
136. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See generally Koh, supra note 128, (dis-
cussion of cases upholding broad assertion of executive power). In addition, Jackson's test became
even more flexible in Justice Rehnquist's hands in Dames & Moore. Rehnquist noted that in any
particular instance, executive actions fall "not neatly in one of the three pigeonholes, but rather at
some point along a spectrum .... This is particularly true as respects cases such as the one before
us, involving responses to international crisis the nature of which Congress can hardly have been
expected to anticipate in any detail." 453 U.S. at 669. Justice Rehnquist relied heavily in Dames &
Moore upon Frankfurter's gloss of a long-continued practice to uphold executive power.
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been a growing gap between the actual conduct of foreign affairs and the
Constitution's text and original intent.137 Ironically, it is precisely the con-
servative proponents of executive power who deemphasize the original in-
tent and text in favor of reliance upon historical practice, thereby imple-
menting Frankfurter's admonition not to ignore "the gloss which life" has
written on the Constitution.1"8 In modern America, that "gloss" inevitably
illuminates executive constitutional power.
The routinization of crises, the rise of inherent executive power, the
delegation of vast emergency power, and the sway of legal realism in the
courts combined to break down the dichotomies upon which the liberal
constitutional tradition was premised. Although a grey area has always
accompanied the fixed dividing line between emergency and normalcy, the
hazy middle zone has expanded to include most important executive exer-
cises of foreign affairs power, resulting in broad, virtually unchecked pres-
idential power." 9
IV. THE FAILURE OF REFORM
The twin disasters of Vietnam and Watergate created pressure to re-
store the liberal distinctions so critical to the definition and limitation of
emergency powers.' 4 Even strong supporters of the growth of executive
power during the 1940s and 1950s, such as Arthur Schlesinger and
Another example of the judiciary's reluctance to rely on fixed rules to determine foreign affairs
issues is Judge Adams decision in Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dismissing
constitutional challenge to Viet Nam War because non-justiciable issue), affd sub nom., Atlee v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Judge Adams' rationale was in part based on the fear that "setting
forth rules, [might] create a rigid matrix that would unnecessarily restrict the executive sometime in
the future." Id.
137. See supra note 26. This gap can also be perceived in Supreme Court decisions which have,
since the Pentagon Papers case, consistently upheld executive power as a matter of result, even as they
rhetorically adhere to Congressional dominance. Edgar & Schmidt, Curtis-Wright Comes Home: Exec-
utive Power In National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 353 (1986).
138. Shortly after Attorney General Meese's speech extolling a jurisprudence of original inten-
tion, I argued a case raising the question of whether the President had the power to terminate a treaty
and deprive a citizen of valuable rights under the treaty. I relied heavily on an originalist jurispru-
dence, while the Justice Department ignored the views of the Founders, focusing instead on recent
historical practice. The District Court held that the issue presented a non-justiciable political ques-
tion. Beacon Products v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (D. Mass. 1986). But cf. Meese, supra
note 135 (arguing for strong executive power as matter of original intent). In its report on the War
Powers Legislation, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that those supporting war powers
legislation emphasized the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the importance of the congres-
sional war power for a system of government based on the separation of powers and checks and
balances. Those testifying against the war powers legislation cited historical instances in which the
President has used the armed forces without the consent of Congress and the necessity of rapid action
under the conditions of the nuclear age. S. REP. No. 220, supra note 26, at 7.
139. Mensch, supra note 131; see also Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1352-53 (in this stage most
situations are "not absolutely one thing or another.") In short, the twilight zone has crowded out the
distinction between night and day and constitutes a major part of our foreign policy-constitutional
spectrum. With the exception of extreme situations-which the FEMA plan probably repre-
sented-"everything is in the middle." Id. at 1352.
140. See supra Part I.
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William J. Fulbright, began to question whether the pendulum had
swung too far.14
1
The enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973142 was an at-
tempt to limit the Commander in Chief powers by restoring the offensive/
defensive distinction central to maintaining the boundary line between
war and peace.143 Section 2 of the Resolution defined a national emer-
gency, which permits the Commander in Chief to introduce armed forces
into hostilities, as arising only "by attack upon the United States, its terri-
tories or possessions, or its armed forces. 144 However, Section 2, entitled
"Purpose and Policy," is merely hortatory.1 5 The Resolution's main at-
tempt to limit executive power is temporal and procedural. Congress tried
to restrict the President's use of troops in hostile situations by placing a
cap of sixty days on the period for which the President can deploy armed
forces without congressional permission. 14 Furthermore, Section 5(c) of
the Resolution permits Congress to direct the President to remove the
troops at any time by concurrent resolution.1 47
Three years later, Congress enacted the National Emergencies Act
(NEA).148 The Act terminated all emergency authority14 9 based on the
past presidential declarations of emergency.1 50 The future exercise of
emergency power required the executive to follow certain procedures."15
In addition, Congress could terminate future emergency declarations by
concurrent resolution.1 52 To assure congressional review of any executive
invocation of emergency power, the NEA mandated that within six
141. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4.
142. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
143. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (explaining role of offensive/defensive force
distinction in liberal tradition of restrained emergency power); see also S. REP. No. 220 supra note
26 (war and peace in the American constitutional system are "separate and distinct," purpose of the
bill is to restore that distinction; id. at 3 (citing Bickel for proposition that restoring the balance in
war powers is "one of line-drawing, of separating one thing from another").
144. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
145. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379
(1988); Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J. 1330, 1335-36 (1984).
146. 50 U.S.C. § 1545(b) (1982). The President could extend the authority for one thirty day
period, after which it would automatically terminate.
147. Id. § 1545(c). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding such legislation
unconstitutional).
148. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
149. Certain emergency powers, such as those exercised pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy
Act, were exempted from the NEA's termination provisions. See infra note 154.
150. 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982) (President must declare national emergency and submit report to
Congress explaining basis for declaration).
152. The initial drafts of the bill contained an automatic termination provision similar to that
found in the War Powers Resolution. See, e.g., National Emergency Hearings, supra note 67, at 527.
The President objected, however, and eventually a compromise was worked out providing for the
legislative veto by concurrent resolution. See National Emergency Act Hearings on H.R. 3884 Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, 17-18 (1976) (remarks of
Sen. Church and Sen. Mathias on executive objections and ultimate compromise).
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months of the declaration of a national emergency, "each House of Con-
gress shall meet" to consider and vote on terminating the emergency.153
Congress next addressed what had been the most fecund statutory
source for the perpetual "emergency" regulation during the prior four de-
cades: Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA).-'5 In
1977, Congress limited TWEA powers to actual wartime conditions, and
enacted a new statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), to constrain the executive's emergency authority. 5 Procedur-
ally, the IEEPA conditioned the President's emergency power on a decla-
ration of national emergency, consultation with Congress and reporting to
Congress every six months. In addition, Congress could terminate this
emergency authority by concurrent resolution. Substantively, IEEPA
strictly defined a national emergency as "any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the
United States," and required that the President declare "a national emer-
gency with respect to such threat." This requirement stemmed "from a
recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are
not to be equated with normal ongoing problems." 56 Congress wanted to
remedy a key problem with Section 5(b) of the TWEA: there were "no
standards" and "no criteria at all" governing the invocation of emergency
power.15
So far, less than two decades after Congress initiated these efforts, the
success of these statutes in limiting executive emergency authority is dis-
mal. These statutes lie in shambles, wrecked by presidential defiance, con-
gressional acquiescence, and judicial undermining. Virtually all observers
recognize the War Powers Resolution to have been a failure. No Presi-
dent has ever filed a report starting the 60 day clock running, despite
repeated executive introduction of armed forces into hostile situations in
Indo-China, Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada, Libya, and most
recently the Persian Gulf.58 Congress has challenged this noncompliance
153. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b)(c) (1982). Congress was determined "to insure that the extraordinary
powers which now reside in the hands of the Chief Executive. . . could be utilized only when emer-
gencies exist, and then, only under safeguards provided by Congressional review." Hearings on H.R.
3884, supra note 152, at 2, 18; see also S. REP. No. 1168, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1976).
154. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b). See generally Emergency Controls on International Economic Trans-
actions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy & Trade of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (outlining broad uses of TWEA).
The TWEA had been exempted from the operation of the National Emergencies Act to allow Con-
gress time to study the particular problems raised by the TWEA statute more carefully. Pub. L. No.
95-223, Section 101(b) & (c), reprinted at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (extension and termination of
national emergency powers under the Trading With the Enemy Act).
155. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. Supp. V §§ 1701 et seq.
(1982).
156. H. R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
157. H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8 (1977) (quoting Professors Stanley D. Metz-
ger and Adreas Lowenfeld).
158. Ely, supra note 145, at 1381 & n.8.
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only once, without a decisive result.1 59 The judiciary has refused to adju-
dicate claims challenging executive action as violative of the Resolution,
most recently holding that a challenge by over 100 Congressmen to the
armed presence in the Persian Gulf was non-justiciable.'x0 Senator Robert
Byrd recently introduced legislation to amend the Resolution by repealing
its most important operative measures, including the 60 day clock.1 ' That
"amendment" appears motivated by a growing conviction that the Resolu-
tion is unworkable. As John Hart Ely put it, "[r]epeal is one way to
increase compliance.' 62
The NEA and IEEPA have not fared much better. The executive has
now utilized IEEPA five times since 1979, and in only one instance-the
sanctions against Iran imposed in 1979-could a "real" national emer-
gency have been said to exist. Resort to emergency powers against Nicara-
gua, South Africa, Libya and Panama has been dubious at best."6 3 One
commentator observes, "These uses suggest that the statute can and will
be invoked whenever the President desires to draw on its broad powers,
whether or not there is a genuine emergency."'' Moreover, when Con-
gress failed to reauthorize the Export Administration Act in 1984, the
President utilized IEEPA to declare a national emergency and continue
the controls on exporters and importers.'65 Again, whether IEEPA's "real
emergency" requirement was met is doubtful.' 66
The NEA's procedural requirements for reporting and congressional
oversight have simply not been followed by either the executive or Con-
gress. The President has submitted declarations of national emergency
that track the language of the statute and provide sparse details of the
basis for the purported emergency. Every six months the executive sub-
mits pro forma reports to Congress. Congress is then mandated under the
159. The one occasion was the Lebanon crisis, when Congress negotiated a "compromise" with
the Reagan Administration permitting troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. Id. at 1381; Glen-
non, supra note 128, at 667.
160. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
161. 100th Cong., 2d Sess., S.J. Res. 323, CONG. REC. S7167, S7169 (daily ed. June 6, 1988).
Congressman Lee Hamilton has introduced similar legislation on the House side. H.R. J. Res. 601,
100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988).
162. Ely, supra note 145, at 1384.
163. Carter, International Economic Sanctions, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1159, 1235 (1987) (resorting
to IEEPA against Nicaragua, South Africa and Libya seems questionable). See Exec. Order No.
12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986); Exec. Order
No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985) (South
Africa); Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (1988) (Panama).
164. Carter, supra note 163, at 1235; see also Koh, supra note 128, at 1264-65. Congressman
Bingham, the main sponsor of IEEPA, has stated that the invocation of emergency authority with
respect to Nicaragua perverts the intention of Congress in enacting the IEEPA emergency standard.
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1985, at E22, col. 3.
165. Exec. Order No. 12,470, March 30, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984).
166. Harris & Bialos, The Strange New World of United States Export Controls Under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71, 81-82 (1985).
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NEA to consider every six months whether to terminate the emergency. 167
Yet Congress has never considered whether to terminate any of these pur-
ported emergencies, despite their continuation for years. Instead of one
generic emergency droning on and on without review, we now have a
number of little but no less dubious emergencies-unchecked, unreviewed,
and perfunctorily reported. This miraculous reform is what Congress
spent six years of intensive investigation, hearings, debate, and legislative
drafting to achieve. 8
The judicial role in the demise of NEA and IEEPA as effective limita-
tions on emergency power has been equally shameful. In a series of cases
the federal courts have undermined the thrust of the reform effort. In
Dames & Moore v. Regan,""9 Justice Rehnquist interpreted the IEEPA
generously to allow the President to nullify pre-judgment attachments of
Iranian assets pursuant to the Iranian Hostage settlement. The Court also
held that Congress had implicitly approved of broad executive emergency
power to act without specific statutory authorization to settle or suspend
American claims against Iran.17 0
Two years after the Dames & Moore decision, the Court, in INS v.
Chadha, struck down as unconstitutional a form of the legislative veto
which provided a critical congressional check in the War Powers Resolu-
tion, NEA, and IEEPA.17 1 Congress responded to Chadha by amending
the NEA to provide for termination of national emergencies by means of a
joint resolution.17 2 The present statute thus requires two-thirds of both
houses to terminate a national emergency, given the almost absolute cer-
tainty of a presidential veto of a joint resolution. The statute now provides
for a termination procedure that would ordinarily be available if there
were no NEA, a remarkable accomplishment given the energy spent on
ensuring that Congress would have a mechanism to "assert its ultimate
authority"17'  over emergency power.
167. NEA requires that "Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and
not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such emergency continues, each House
of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency
shall be terminated. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (1982) (emphasis added). It further provides that "a joint
resolution to terminate a national emergency shall be referred to the appropriate committee" and
"shall be" reported out of committee and acted upon by both houses. Id. § 1622(c).
168. One commentator has noted that the NEA and IEEPA's procedural requirements "remain
at face value, little more than traps for the unwary Presidential draftsman. . . . One must question
whether IEEPA has imposed any appreciable limitation upon the actual exercise of Presidential
power under emergency conditions." Malloy, The Iran Crisis: Law Under Pressure, 1984 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 15, 28, 27.
169. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
170. For a critique of Dames & Moore, see Koh, supra note 128, at 1310-11.
171. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The War Powers Resolution contained both a legislative veto, and an
automatic termination provision that survives Chadha. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1545(b) with § 154(c).
172. Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-93 § 801, 99 Stat. 448 (1985). Unlike a concurrent
resolution, a joint resolution is subject to executive veto and therefore survives the Chadha decision.
173. 122 CONG. REC. 28227 (1976) (statement of Senators Church and Mathias).
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A year after the Chadha decision, the Court in Regan v. Wald174 again
affirmed executive emergency power, this time reading the grandfather
provision of IEEPA to permit the continuation of the old embargoes
against Cuba, North Vietnam, China, and several other nations. The
Court's broad interpretation disregarded clear congressional intent.1 75 The
implications of the Court's opinion are broader than its actual holding. As
Professor Koh notes, the combination of Dames & Moore, Regan v.
Wald, and the Court's more recent decision in Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y,178 "have provided the lower courts with a the-
ory of statutory construction that has legitimated broad exercises of emer-
gency economic powers under claims of delegated authority.) 177
Finally, a Federal District Court in 1986 ruled that whether Nicaragua
posed a sufficient threat to warrant the President's declaration of emer-
gency pursuant to the IEEPA presented a non-justiciable question. 1 7  The
Court of Appeals affirmed on other grounds, addressing inter alia, Con-
gress' failure to meet to consider a vote to terminate the emergency. Read-
ing the "shall meet to consider a vote" provision as only giving those who
want to vote an opportunity to do so, the court in essence held that there
was no legal remedy for a congressional failure to comply with the
statute.1
7 1
The combined impact of these decisions is the following: (1) executive
emergency power under IEEPA must be broadly interpreted; (2) the at-
tempt to limit the circumstances under which the President can exercise
emergency powers by defining emergency is judicially unenforceable; (3)
Congress' only mechanism for terminating an emergency the President
wants to continue is to pass a joint resolution with a two-thirds majority,
given the virtual certainty of a Presidential veto; 80 and (4) whatever pro-
174. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
175. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 250-57 (Blackman, J., dissenting). 468 U.S. at 262 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Commentators have generally viewed the Court as distorting congressional intent.
Note, Executive Authority: Restriction of Travel to Cuba, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 217, 224 (1985)
(questioning Court's view of congressional intent); Note, Executive Authority-Broad Presidential
Embargo Powers Preserved Despite Statutory Construction, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 401, 408 (1985)
(Court replaced congressional views with its own); Note, The President's International Emergency
Economic Powers After Regan v. Wald: An Unchecked Proliferation of Authority, 12 SYRACUSE
IN'L L.J. 125, 128 (1985) (decision appears to contravene clear legislative intent of IEEPA); Note,
The Right to Travel & Presidential Emergency Authority: The Supreme Court Lowers the Standard
of Review in Regan v. Wald, 44 ALB. L. REv. 1001, 1002 (1985) (Court found executive power
"despite clear expressions of legislative intent to the contrary").
176. 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (permitting executive discretion in imposing sanctions against nations
that violate whaling ban, despite language and legislative history that seemingly deny such discretion).
177. Koh, supra note 128, at 1305-06 & n.232.
178. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-95 (D. Mass. 1986); aff'd on
other grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (91st Cir. 1987).
179. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1987).
180. The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Bishop, 555 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1977), one
of the few cases to provide any review of the exercise of emergency power, clearly understood the
implications of these judicial decisions. Writing in 1977, prior to Chadha, Judge Breintenstein noted:
"If President Ford was correct in his position that the provision of the National Emergencies Act for
termination of an emergency by act of Congress is unconstitutional and, if the government is correct in
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cedures Congress has established to review these emergencies are legally
unenforceable in the courts. It is hard to discern any progress from the
post-war era of drastic abuses that Congress wanted to end.
V. RECENT EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY AUTHORITY
In addition to dismantling the reform statutes of the 1970s, Congress
and the President have been busily creating new broad and undefined
delegations of emergency authority. The "drug crisis," most recently de-
scribed by President Bush as equivalent to "an invading army,"1 ' led
Congress to create "emergency" exceptions to the deeply rooted tradition
prohibiting the use of the military to enforce civilian laws. " Throughout
the past decade, Congress has continually broadened those "emergency"
exceptions.18 In April 1986, President Reagan issued a secret directive
authorizing the use of 160 United States Army troops as logistical support
for the effort to uproot the drug trade in Bolivia, because the "emergency
circumstance" of a serious threat to national security was present.'"
Two additional measures, which thus far have not been enacted, illus-
trate the current mood in Congress. Amendments offered by Representa-
tives Bennett and Hunter would have allowed the military to participate
in searches outside the United States, and seizures and arrests within the
territory of the United States. Though destructive of the principle that the
military not become involved in civilian law enforcement, 5 these amend-
ments passed the House 359 to 52 and 237 to 177, respectively. 6 While
finding some support in the Senate, both amendments were ultimately de-
the position which it takes in the instant case that the judiciary may not terminate an emergency, the
awesome power of the President to declare an emergency and thereby activate 470 federal laws is
unfettered." Id. at 776-77.
181. Then President-elect Bush recently turned to the oft-used metaphor: "We are at war. Drugs
are a terrifying, insidious enemy; they challenge almost every aspect of American public policy-the
law, our national security, our public health. And the threat they pose reaches deep into our national
soul." N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at 10, col. 1.
182. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (1982). See Review of the Administration's Drug Interdiction Efforts:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1983) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles); Note, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act
Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 404, 417
(1986).
183. For example, in authorizing the use of Federal law enforcement officials and military per-
sonnel and equipment to fight drug trafficking or illegal immigration outside of the United States,
Congress in 1986 broadened the emergency circumstances in which such activities would be permitted.
10 U.S.C. § 374(B)(3) (Supp. 1987) (Note on 1986 amendment). Congress also permitted the inter-
ception of vessels and aircraft outside United States territory by military personnel in emergency
circumstances. 10 U.S.C. § 374(B) (Supp. 1987).
184. Have We Really Gone to the Source, L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1986, § 1, at 4 col. 2. (re-
printed from Washington Post).
185. H.R. RlP. No. 51, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 1781, 1799-80 (dissenting views of John Conyers).
186. 132 CONG. REc. H6660-6688 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986).
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feated, after having been characterized by Senator Sam Nunn as repre-
senting the largest peacetime grant of power to the President in history.1""
The perception of a crisis in Central America has also led Congress to
relax controls on the use of the National Guard. Until 1986, only in time
of national emergency or war could the President deploy a state's Na-
tional Guard units outside the United States without the governor of the
state's approval. Non-emergency National Guard training exercises
abroad required the governor's consent."' In 1986, Congress enacted the
Montgomery Amendment to prohibit governors from withholding their
consent to the deployment of National Guard units outside the United
States because of an objection to the location, purpose, type or schedule of
such assignment."8 9 The immediate purpose was to prohibit the governors
from exercising a veto on the Administration's use of the National Guard
to conduct exercises in Honduras. What Congress' reaction did, however,
was to eviscerate the division between the executive's unfettered emer-
gency power to deploy the National Guard abroad and the executive's
non-emergency power to send those units abroad for training, the latter
power formerly requiring the consent of the state's governor.' 90
Other newly discovered crises leading to the promulgation of emergency
plans and regulations are posed by immigration and terrorism. These two
187. 132 CONG. REC. S13975, S13978, S14009 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986).
188. 10 U.S.C. §§ 672, 673 (1982). Apart from declared national emergencies, there were a few
other specifically defined conditions under which the President could order National Guard members
to active federal duty. 10 U.S.C. §§ 673(a),(b) (1982).
189. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-661 § 522, (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 672(f) (Supp.
1987)).
190. Governors Rudy Perpich of Minnesota, and Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts promptly
challenged the constitutionality of the Montgomery Amendment. The First Circuit dismissed
Dukakis' lawsuit. Dukakis v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988). The Eighth
Circuit, however, upheld Perpich's challenge. Perpich v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, No. 87-5345 (8th
Cir. Dec. 6, 1988) reh'g en bane granted (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1989) (WESTLAW Allfeds Library).
The reasoning of Perpich v. U.S. Dept of Defense is instructive on just how muddy the emergency/
non-emergency distinction has become. The Eighth Circuit understood that the key constitutional
defect of the Montgomery Amendment was its evisceration of the line between executive emergency
authority and non-emergency power requiring the governor's consent. The court attempted to respond
by requiring "that before the federal government can exercise its army power to supersede the re-
served state authority over the militia, its actions must be motivated by a state of events which
amounts to a 'national exigency.'" Id.
The Eighth Circuit decision in Perpich was by a divided panel, and it is unclear whether it will
survive appeal. Indeed the Eighth Circuit has vacated the panel opinion pending en bane review. Yet
even the panel's courageous opinion illustrates the rapid demise of the emergency/non-emergency
dichotomy. Apparently worried that its opinion would be attacked as interfering with federal foreign
affairs power, the majority noted that:
the power to determine the existence of such circumstances [a "national exigency" or "specific
threat to national security"] belongs only to Congress or the President. Once this power is
exercised, the substance of the determination cannot be challenged by the states or by individ-
ual National Guard members sent into federal service. Such a challenge would involve a cen-
tral political question.
In short, had Congress conditioned executive power to train National Guard units abroad without the
governor's consent upon a declaration of "national emergency," then the executive's authority to use
the National Guard would be unreviewable. This is the bright line drawn by the only court willing to
engage in any line-drawing.
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emergencies tend to be linked, because the threat from abroad seems per-
sonified by the presence of aliens living in our midst. A recent draft Exec-
utive Order allegedly contained provisions for "alien control," the "deten-
tion of enemy aliens," and the seizure of their property.19 ' Rex-84-Bravo,
a national simulation staged by FEMA in April 1984, involved the activa-
tion of "emergency legislation" and "assumption of emergency powers"
including a "roundup of Central American refugees. 19 2
The Iran-Contra affair also illustrated the danger of emergency power
run amok. Iran-Contra exposed a secret, parallel government, developed
outside of normal constitutional processes to respond to perceived national
security crises. Secret institutions were created to carry out United States
foreign policy, including "off the shelf" companies, 93 capable of con-
ducting operations usually undertaken by governmental institutions. The
resurgent reliance on agencies, "companies," and "enterprises" to conduct
"sensitive" national security operations, shielded from the democratic pro-
cess, undermines executive accountability and blurs the line between dem-
ocratic and authoritarian government.1 94
During his last months in office, President Reagan issued an Executive
Order outlining his wide ranging emergency powers: to use military per-
sonnel in civilian law enforcement, to regulate aliens, to impose wage and
salary controls, to control civilian transportation, to acquire and lease
191. B. BRADLEE, supra note 1, at 132; Reagan Advisors Ran Secret Government, supra note 1.
An internal FEMA memo outlining the martial law aspects of the plan was described by the Herald
as somewhat resembling a paper FEMA Director Louis Gruffrida wrote as a student at the Army
War College, a paper which discussed the most efficient way to remove an estimated 500,000 militant
"American Negroes by placing them in internment camps in case of a black revolt." Miami Herald,
July 19, 1987 at 17a, col. 1; see also B. BRADLEE, supra note 1, at 133-35.
192. Reagan Advisors Ran Secret Government, supra note 1. The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) has also developed contingency plans to deal with "Alien Terrorists and Un-
desirables." See Investigative Division of INS, Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan
(1986) (copy on file with author). The Office of the General Counsel recognized in 1986 that in an
emergency the INS may need to "place strict control on certain alien nationals or classes of aliens,"
requiring the "issuance of emergency regulations." Id. Memo of April 23, 1986 from Office of Gen-
eral Counsel. During the Iranian hostage crisis, the Attorney General actually promulgated a regula-
tion requiring all Iranian students to report to a local INS office, a regulation upheld by the D.C.
Circuit. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). The
Circuit Court refused to "pass judgment on the decisions of the President in the field of foreign
policy", and thereby accepted the challenged regulation as rational. 617 F.2d at 748. Only the four
circuit judges dissenting from the refusal to rehear the case en banc suggested a traditional liberal
analysis, under which the case presented a conflict between necessity and the rule of law. 617 F.2d at
754-55. Though in dictum, the Supreme Court also recently noted the constitutionality of detaining
aliens during a time of war. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1987).
193. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 80, at 413 (describing Col. North's testimony).
194. See generally B. MoYERs, THE SEcRET GOVERNMENT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS
(1988) (describing undermining of democracy by development of secret government). The Miami Her-
ald exposure of the FEMA plan reported FEMA's activities against a background of the operation by
some of President Reagan's top advisors of a "virtual parallel government," "almost from the day
Reagan took office." Reagan Advisors Ran Secret Government, supra note 1. In an ironically secret
assessment of these activities, Arthur Liman, lead counsel for the Senate Iran-Contra Committee,
called it "a secret government within a government." Id. Sources told The Herald that the arrange-
ment permitted Reagan administration officials to claim that they were not involved in controversial
or illegal activities. Id.
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property, and to take control of civilian nuclear plants.'95 As usual, the
Order defines the requisite emergency circumstance broadly: "any occur-
rence including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency,
or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the na-
tional security of the United States." 96 Not only have the reform statutes
failed, but emergency authority continues to escalate, unbounded by seri-
ous limitations.
VI. RESTORING AND ULTIMATELY TRANSFORMING LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY
A. The New Reformists
A controversy now rages as to the causes of and the lessons to be
learned from the failure of 1970s reforms. One perspective views the pro-
posals to curb emergency power as fundamentally misguided. According to
this outlook, the magnitude of the threat facing the country requires a
strong President and a cooperative Congress supportive of executive initia-
tives. For these "interventionists," the lesson of the Vietnam War and the
Iran-Contra affair is not the need for more congressional checks on execu-
tive power, but rather the removal of such restraints. The escalation of the
Iran-Contra affair, for example, is ascribed to Congress' attempts to inter-
fere with executive conduct of foreign policy.' 7 Prominent interventionists
comment that the constraints imposed by Congress "have undermined
rather than enhanced deterrence," and "fueled potentially catastrophic
constitutional confrontations with the Presidency"; 98 Vietnam and Iran-
Contra require reform to "restore the Presidency to the position it held
just a few administrations ago."'' 99
Powerful adherents from both major parties share the view that conflict
and confrontation between the President and Congress must be reduced,
and that the constitutional separation of powers must be weakened. Lloyd
Cutler, President Carter's White House Counsel; Douglass Dillon, a dis-
tinguished public servant in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration;
and Senator Nancy Kassebaum joined other luminaries in establishing the
Committee on the Constitutional System in 1982. The frustrations Cutler
and others felt during the Carter Administration inspired their renewed
195. Exec. Order 12,656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,491 (1988).
196. Id. § 101. Executives of the nuclear industry were dismayed that the order did not make
clear what political, technological or military factors would be considered a national security emer-
gency. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988 at B6, col. 1.
197. J. MOORE, GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND COVERT OPERATIONS, (1980) reprinted in
Iran-Contra Report, supra note 80, at pp. 614, 617 (minority report). The Minority Report stated
that a number of the mistakes of the Iran-Contra Affair resulted directly from the "political guerilla
warfare between the legislative and executive branches." Id. at 437, 439.
198. Id.
199. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 80, at 449, 585 (minority report).
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interest in a more parliamentary system of government as a means of re-
storing executive authority to lead the country and act decisively. The
Committee's Basic Policy Statement asserted, "The checks and balances
inspired by the experience of the Eighteenth century have led repeatedly,
in the Twentieth Century, to governmental stalemate and deadlock, to in-
decision and inaction in the face of urgent problems."200 Echoing Senator
Fulbright's sentiments during the early 1960s,2" 1 Dillon asked whether
modern America "can continue to afford the luxury of the separation of
power."20 2
However, the present quest to restore American dominance through a
stronger executive203 is quixotic. The decline of global power is less a
function of constitutional structure than of economic and political change:
namely, the growth of Soviet military power, the economic competition
from other capitalist countries, and the rise of revolutionary nationalism
in the Third World. As the Soviets discovered in Afghanistan, the defeat
of a strong nationalist movement is difficult even if a superpower's legal
structure facilitates the flexibility necessary for the pursuit of an aggres-
sive foreign policy. Recent theorists argue that the decline of American
power can be linked to the costs of defending and extending our power
throughout the world.20 4 The escalation of intervention around the world
will only hasten the long-term decline.
The interventionist vision should also be rejected because it results in
the chronic abuse of executive power. The interventionist solution essen-
tially removes the tension between the rule of law and the necessities of a
strong foreign policy by sacrificing the former ideal. Even if it were possi-
ble for strong executive action to restore American power, is it worth the
diminution in democratic government? The domestic order cannot be in-
sulated from the international arena; eviscerating legal restraints on the
executive's conduct of foreign policy inevitably will lead to undermining
domestic civil liberties.205 McCarthyism was directly related to the rise of
broad emergency power to fight the perceived Communist threat
200. A. SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 302-03 (1986) (quoting Co iMrr-
TEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, BASIC POLICY STATEMENT: AFTER Two CENTURIES: OUR
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION IN TODAY'S COMPLEX WORLD 3 (1983)).
201. See supra note 69.
202. Dillon, The Challenge of Modern Governance, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
THE BICENTENNIAL PAPERS ON THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 28-29 (D.
Robinson ed. 1985). Indeed, Fulbright now supports the move toward a more parliamentary system to
provide for more cooperation and less conflict in the making of foreign policy. J. FULBRIGHT, THE
PRICE OF EMPIRE 60-75 (1989).
203. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 200, at 302-03 (1986).
204. D. CALLEO, BEYOND AMERICAN HEGEMONY (1987); R. GILI'IN, WAR & CHANGE IN
WORLD POLrTCS 156-77 (1981); P. KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987);
M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982); see also Koh, supra note 128, at 1293
n.170.
205. See supra note 4; see also S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong. 8 (1973) (when checks and balances
are disrupted in foreign policy, "all other [areas of public policy] are affected, and so also are the basic
rights of the citizen").
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abroad.2 °6 The sense of urgency that led Congress to permit "emergency"
use of the military in civilian law enforcement to combat drug smugglers
has led to a relaxation of Fourth Amendment restraints on the war on
drugs at home.20 7
B. Current Attempts to Revive Restraints on the Executive
Supporters of the reformist initiatives of the 1970s have, of course, a
different explanation for their failure. Their views can be grouped into
two camps, labelled by Kenneth Sharpe as the "aberrationists" and the
"legalists." 2 °8 The aberrationists blame the failure to comply with the
Constitution or law on individual mistakes. The majority report of the
Iran-Contra Committees, for example, argues, "[Tihe Iran-Contra Affair
resulted from the failure of individuals to observe the law, not from defi-
ciencies in existing law or in our system of governance."20 9
Yet while any one scandal can always be blamed on individual mis-
takes, the inability of the reform statues to check executive abuse in a
wide variety of emergency power contexts210 simply cannot be the product
of individual dishonesty, corruption, ambition or stupidity. As Professor
Harold Koh perceptively comments, the Iran-Contra affair represented
not simply an aberration, "but deeper systemic flaws in the current legal
structure of our foreign policymaking process. 211
The legalist response to the reformist failure proposes stronger and
more comprehensive reforms designed to restore the dichotomy between
emergency and normal executive power, war and peace, and ultimately
constitutional versus unconstitutional government. Some recent proposals
are process-oriented. Professor Koh advocates a new national security
"charter," which would "seek to alter recurrent patterns of executive be-
havior by restructuring the institutional attributes" that contribute to ex-
ecutive excesses.2 12 Professor Koh's design would encourage Congress and
the judiciary to become involved in foreign policy issues. Other, more spe-
cific, process-oriented reforms would provide for judicial review of execu-
206. See, e.g., Douglas, The Black Silence of Fear, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1952, § 6 (Magazine) at
7. Similarly, the Executive's abuse of power in Vietnam encouraged President Nixon to engage in
unlawful conduct to thwart the domestic anti-war movement and ultimately helped create the environ-
ment in which the Watergate scandal was launched. T. SORENSON, WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHT
18-19 (1975); Bernstein, The Road to Watergate and Beyond: The Growth and Abuse of Executive
Authority Since 1940, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 58 (1976).
207. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Association, No. 87-1555 (U.S., March 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds Library) (Marshall, J., dissenting); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, No. 87-1879 (U.S., March 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Library).
208. Sharpe, The Real Cause of Irangate, 68 FOREIGN POL'Y 19, 34 (1987).
209. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 80, at 423. The minority report agreed "that the underlying
cause of the Iran-Contra Affair had to do with people rather than with laws." Id. at 583 (minority
report).
210. See supra Parts IV, V.
211. Koh, supra note 128, at 1257.
212. Id. at 1323.
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tive use of force pursuant to the War Powers Resolution,213 and tighten
the requirements for executive notification to Congress of anticipated co-
vert action. 14 In addition, some commentators urge the imposition of
stricter substantive limits on the President's emergency powers, such as
providing a stricter definition of what constitutes a national emergency,2 15
prohibiting certain types of covert activity,21 ' or restricting the situations
in which the President can use force against another nation.2" 7 In the cur-
rent political context none of these process-oriented or substantive propos-
als are likely to be adopted.
C. Beyond Legalism: The Connection Between Substantive Policy and
Legal Reform
The legalist proposals, while recognizing a systemic pattern, still fail to
address the basic problem leading to both the events of the Iran-Contra
affair and the drafting of the FEMA plan. The line separating executive
emergency power and normal constitutional government has become
blurred, not only because of legal or institutional failure, but primarily
because of an aggressive United States assertion of power in the interna-
tional arena.
Old lessons have to be constantly relearned. The debate over the Iran-
Contra scandal narrowly focused on such issues as what the President
knew, whether the law was violated, and whether new legislation is
needed. Commentators have generally ignored the causal connection be-
tween the persistent failure of the executive to heed constitutional or legal
limitations in its efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government and an
213. Ely, supra note 145. Ratner & Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War
Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 715 (1984). These commentators suggest that the judiciary
not employ such mechanisms as the political question doctrine or standing to avoid ruling on whether
the executive has complied with the War Powers resolution.
214. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 80, at 423.
215. Relyea, Reconsidering the National Emergencies Act: Its Evolution, Implementation and
Deficiencies in 5 THE PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 274, 317-18 (G. Hoxie ed.
1984) (urging definition of conditions that constitute a "national emergency").
216. H. R. REP. No. 833, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence recommended prohibiting various classes of covert action such as "efforts to subvert democratic
governments" and assassinations of foreign officials. Church Comm. Report supra note 90. S. REP.
No. 755, Book 1, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 448 (1976); see also Lobel, supra note 26 (suggesting prohibit-
ing executive sponsored paramilitary action undertaken without congressional approval).
217. See Franck, After the Fall, The New Procedure for Congressional Control Over the War
Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 639 (1977) (restricting Presidential wars to situations of actual or
imminent attack on U.S. territory, on the armed forces, and perhaps on civilians abroad, which would
be enforced by the "prior restraint" that no funds may be expended for armed forces involved in
hostilities except in these situations or when explicitly authorized by Congress); Glennon, The War
Powers Resolution Ten Years Later. More Politics than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 580 (1984).
See Congressman DeFazio's proposed amendments, H.R. J. Res. 462, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. § 3, § 7
(1988) (limiting situations of use of force and providing for judicial enforcement); Ely, supra note
143, at 1393 n.45 (describing Defazio amendments); see also Note, Realism, Liberalism and the War
Powers Resolution, 102 HARv. L. REV. 637, 653 (1982) (proposing that one alternative "representa-
tive of liberal thinking" is to reinstate the Senate's original substantive restraints).
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aggressive view of American power in the world.21 Yet two decades ago,
the Vietnam War vividly brought this lesson into focus.
As the war in Vietnam dragged on, thoughtful commentators began to
question whether our constitutional assumptions could withstand the
quest for empire. The doubts that had earlier appeared in the 1890's as to
whether the Constitution could function "for a conquering nation"21 9
reappeared forcefully in the 1960s. Henry Steele Commager wrote that
the "abuse of power by Presidents is a reflection, and perhaps a conse-
quence, of abuse of power by the American . . .nation."22 In the long
run, "abuse of executive power cannot be separated from abuse of na-
tional power. If we subvert world order and destroy world peace, we must
inevitably subvert and destroy our own political institutions first." '221 The
answer to abuse of executive power, was and still is, neither the removal
of evil people, nor the reform of insufficient laws, but rather the dissipa-
tion of the "forces, motives and fears which underlie the exercise and the
rationale of excessive presidential power." '222
The Vietnam War also led William Fulbright to re-evaluate dramati-
cally his earlier views on empowering the Presidency. The failure in Viet-
nam provided an occasion to rethink the messianic anti-communism that
drove the United States to unilaterally intervene anywhere in the world in
the name of national security. For Fulbright the conflict was clear. If
"America is to become an empire, there is very little chance that it can
avoid becoming a virtual dictatorship as well."'22
While better Presidents, advisors, and laws are both necessary and sig-
nificant in curbing executive power, the failure of legal reforms reflects
the nation's failure to dramatically alter its substantive world view.224 The
procedural constraints the Constitution places on executive action reflect a
substantive vision of America's place and role in the world. That vision
stemmed from a militarily weak America, whose leaders sought to avoid,
218. See, e.g., Said, Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors 15 CRrrICAL IN-
QUIRY 205, 216 (1989) (little of immense media and opinion deluge on Iran-Contra affair paid any
attention to fact that our Iranian and Central American policies are nakedly imperialist policies). For
example, the Iran-Contra report paid no attention to the connection between the substance of the
Reagan policy against Nicaragua and the unconstitutional means used to implement that policy. For
two exceptions, see Scharp, supra note 208; Krautheimer, The Price of Power, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb.
9, 1987, at 23.
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
220. H. COINIAGER, supra note 53, at 57.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 57. Presidential adviser and well known historian Arthur Schlesinger arrived at a
similar conclusion in The Imperial Presidency, finding it difficult to reconcile the traditional view of
separation of powers with post-War American foreign policy. The "Constitution could not easily
sustain the weight of the indiscriminate globalism to which the Korean War gave birth." "This vision
of the American role in the world," Schlesinger wrote, "unbalanced and overwhelmed the Constitu-
tion." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 168-69. For Schlesinger, the Johnson Administration's,
theory of "[diefensive war had always been the theory of empire." Id.
223. 115 CONG. REC. 16618 (June 19, 1969).
224. Sharpe, supra note 208.
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as much as possible, involvement in European wars.22 That vision no
longer comports with our role as the dominant world power.
Our relative power to shape world affairs has declined since the 1950s;
a spate of recent scholarship suggests that the decline will continue.226
The continued quest for dominance will therefore surely bring with it
continued crisis. The more forcefully America strives to maintain hegem-
ony, the stronger the perception of crisis will be. The policy of hegemonic
maintenance is simply inconsistent with reinvigorating the carefully bal-
anced dualities encapsulated in our constitutional assumptions. 22 7
An essential prerequisite to any legalist revival of the liberal model is
the dissipation of the sense of permanent crisis which underlies the mud-
dying of the emergency/non-emergency distinction.228 Revitalizing the lib-
eral legal paradigm requires a substantive redefinition of United States
national security that does not necessitate the present imperial responsibil-
ity which inevitably leads to continued crisis.
Such a transformation would involve several related components. First,
the pervasive anti-communism that has been so central to the foreign pol-
icy of each of the past eight administrations must be discarded. Second,
the United States must relinquish the prevailing assumption that our na-
tional security requires the prevention or overthrow of leftist revolutionary
governments throughout the world. 29 The breakup of the monolithic
communist world, which began with the Chinese-Soviet rupture of the
early 1960's and has proceeded apace more recently under Gorbachev's
Soviet Union, should force a re-evaluation of the view that any leftist
revolution automatically leads to a Soviet client state.23' Third, in re-
sponse to Gorbachev's initiatives, we must move to end the cold war and
substitute cooperation for containment in our relations with the Soviets.231
225. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 204.
227. See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
228. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized in proposing war powers legislation
in 1973, the bill would not restore checks and balances without substantive changes in American
foreign policy: "If the country is to be continually at war, or in crisis, or on the verge of war, or in
small-scale, partial or surrogate war, the force of events must lead inevitably toward executive domi-
nation despite any legislative roadblocks that may be placed in the executive's way." S. REt'. No. 220,
93rd Cong, 1st Sess. 20 (1973).
229. Sharpe, supra note 208, at 41; see also W. WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DI-
PLOMACY 212 (1959) (essence of different foreign policy would be open door for revolutions).
230. The New York Times terms recent changes in the communist world "stunning." More Ice
Keeps Breaking, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1988, at 22, col. 1 (editorial). Those changes have occurred in
both domestic and foreign policy. The recent actual or promised withdrawals of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, Cuban troops from Angola, and Vietnamese troops from Cambodia seem to signal a
different attitude about the willingness of these states to intervene militarily to support revolutions. Id.
(calling for end to United States policy in Cambodia to "aid[] or tolerate[] any faction that resisted a
Soviet-supported occupation"). Internally the democratic changes recently introduced in the Soviet
Union, Hungary and Poland are simply the most dramatic aspects of an increasing decentralization
and experimentation in the communist world.
231. Many commentators from various political spectrums have recently called for ending the cold
war. Barnet, Fear of Soviet Changes Sells America Short, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1988 § II at 5, col. 4;
Cohen, Will We End The Cold War? The Next President's Historic Opportunity, 245 NATION 293
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Finally, a different foreign policy requires recognizing and adapting to the
economic and political interdependence of nation-states, requiring, in
Mikhail Gorbachev's words, "the need to devise a fundamentally new ma-
chinery for the functioning of the world economy."2"2 This would require
increased United States reliance on multilateral political, economic, and
judicial institutions to resolve international problems.
These changes are not a panacea; problems with other nations, ter-
rorists, drug smugglers, and an influx of aliens would continue to exist. A
transformed foreign policy would, however, facilitate our ability to address
the causes of these problems and thereby alleviate the sense of crisis per-
vading the nation.2"3
Legalist proposals would be less likely to be perceived as unrealistic if
the United States were to modify basic assumptions underlying foreign
policy. While any of the legal reforms outlined earlier would represent
improvements over the present situation,2 ' the most effective reform ap-
proach would involve revitalizing the liberal model contained in our origi-
nal constitutional framework. This approach would not only provide for
judicial or congressional review of executive emergency action, but also
substantively restrict executive constitutional emergency power. The only
emergency power clearly provided under the Constitution is that of de-
fending against armed attacks by other nations. In other situations, the
executive should be forced to seek specific congressional authorization
prior to acting, or to act unconstitutionally in those rare emergencies
(1988). Cohen, Centrists Lack the Guts to Respond to Gorbachev, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1988, at
A23, col. 2; Parks, To Clear Cold War Leftovers, L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1988, § V, at 1, col. 1;
Rosenthal, Gorbachev in Motion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at El, col. 1; Rostow, Five Great Goals
for the Next Generation, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6, 1988, at 30, col. 3; Ullman, Ending the Cold
War, 72 FOREIGN POL'Y 130 (1988).
232. Gorbachev's Olive Branch, Wash. Post., Dec. 11, 1988, at KI, col. 1.
233. Various commentators have argued that charting a new cooperative direction in U.S. foreign
policy would reverse the disproportionate growth of the military expenditures and the over-extension
of U.S. military power that has been a major factor in the decline of U.S. economic strength. P.
KENNEDY, supra note 204, 514-534; Shulman, The Superpowers: Dance of the Dinosaurs, 66 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 494, 508 (1988).
Recognizing and tolerating nationalism in the middle east would in the long run alleviate the ter-
rorism problem in that the United States would not be perceived as the main defender of the status
quo. Friedman, Camp David Accords 10 Years Later: Carter Ponders Why It Turned Sour, N.Y.
Times, March 26, 1989, § I, at 4, col. I (former President Carter believes committing ourselves to
peace and Palestinian rights will dissipate hatred against United States). Relinquishing our reliance
on anti-communism should lead to a reluctance to continue to ignore the drug activities of some of our
"friends" in Latin and South America in return for their support against communism. See e.g., Berke,
Foreign Policy Said to Hinder Drug War, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1989 at 5, col. 4 (Senate Report
concludes that we tolerated drug activities because we did not want to crack down on anti-communists
we supported). Focusing on the economic problems of Latin America in a multilateral fashion instead
of supporting corrupt military run governments or counter-revolutionary groups would, in all likeli-
hood, reduce the flow of immigrants from such nations as El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and
Haiti. See generally Cohen, Will We End the Cold War?, supra note 231, at 312-13 (discussing
implications of post-cold war foreign policy for solving current problems). While we would still face
serious problems, those problems might be more manageable without a "crisis" or "war" imagery.
234. See supra notes 211-17.
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which threaten the nation's existence and for which response is needed
before Congress can meet.
3 5
This approach could be imposed on a variety of emergency contexts
now covered by different statutes. For example, the War Powers Resolu-
tion could be strengthened by making legally enforceable the "Purpose
and Policy" section which permits presidential resort to "emergency use of
armed forces only in the event of an attack upon the United States, or its
armed forces."' 23 6 The objection to this approach is that "it truly is impos-
sible to predict and specify all the possible situations in which the Presi-
dent will need to act to protect the nation's security but will not have time
to consult Congress."23 For example, commentators and executive offi-
cials cite a hypothetical future attack on Canada or Mexico, the 1962
Cuban missile crisis, and the suppression of civil insurrection abroad as
instances in which unilateral executive use of force would be both war-
ranted and beyond the executive's traditional constitutional war powers.238
The liberal response is that the avoidance of unilateral executive mili-
tary adventures abroad requires that a clear line be drawn limiting execu-
tive authority: the Constitution drew that line at executive response to an
attack by another nation. Emergency situations, which threaten the life of
the nation and require the executive to respond so quickly as to preclude
prior congressional authorization, are best addressed not by allowing
broad executive discretion, even limited temporally, but by forcing the
President to respond to such emergencies by openly acting unconstitution-
ally. The President would then immediately seek congressional and public
ratification of such action.
In a related context, executive power to engage in covert paramilitary
activity abroad without explicit congressional authorization should be
eliminated, as recommended by the House Governmental Operations
235. Professors Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage have also concluded that the "solution to
the problem of emergency" is:
[I]f the President believes that the necessity is sufficiently great, he should act and look to
Congress for ratification of his actions. He should not claim an emergency power to act against
the law for the good of the nation, nor should he claim the exclusive right to determine what is
good for the nation.
F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 26, at 15.
236. The only other occasions upon which the President can introduce U.S. armed forces into
hostilities are pursuant to specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c)
(1982). Various commentators have suggested that the Resolution would be strengthened by making
Section 2(c) -legally binding and enforceable. See supra note 217. There is strong sentiment among
commentators that § 1544(c) should be expanded to include the allowance of emergency use of force to
protect citizens of the United States in very narrowly defined situations, as the original Senate version
of the Resolution permitted. S. 440, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973). See also Durand v. Hollins, 8
Fed. Cas. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 4,186) (permitting executive use of armed forces to "protect"
citizens).
237. Ely, supra note 143, at 1394; see also Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad.Law, supra note 25,
at 842-43 (1972) (impossible to codify all possible emergency situations).
238. Ely, supra note 143, at 1394; King & Leavans, Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers
Resolution, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 55, 80-81 (1977); Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,
93 YALE L.J. 1330, 1334 (1984).
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Committee in 1976289 and more recently by Congressman Fowler in
1983.2" 0 This legislation has not been adopted, in part due to the view
that the President needs flexibility to act in an emergency. The President,
however, should not have the flexibility to unilaterally initiate covert war-
fare abroad. Open democratic debate should precede decisions to intervene
militarily in a foreign country to ensure that strong national security con-
cerns are at stake.241 To prohibit paramilitary activities abroad without a
specific congressional authorization would restore the emergency/non-
emergency distinction by forcing the President to act unconstitutionally if
a true national emergency required such a response. Such a rule might
lead a risk-averse president to forego a course of action actually in the
national interest. The dangers of excess caution, however, are far out-
weighed by the dangers of precipitous entry into warfare abroad.
The Church Committee similarly relied on the liberal paradigm to sup-
port its proposed ban on the assassination of foreigners abroad. The Com-
mittee endorsed a proposal that would place any presidential authoriza-
tion of such assassinations in conflict with the law, to ensure that the
President would take such action only when required by an "indispensa-
ble necessity" to the life of the nation.242
Finally, the National Emergencies Act could be amended to limit exec-
utive emergency power to situations in which war has already been de-
clared or the United States has been attacked, unless an emergency is spe-
cifically declared by joint resolution of Congress. Such an amendment,
introduced by Congressman Drinan during the debate on the NEA, was
rejected as hindering executive flexibility to act in times of crisis.2 3
In the context of current United States foreign policy, this traditional
liberal approach of creating sharp, fixed distinctions is likely to be both
utopian and dangerous. If governmental actors consistently perceive revo-
lutionary movements and civil wars to raise grave threats to national se-
curity, the result of the traditional liberal model would be the allowance
of continuous governmental lawlessness. For example, while Oliver North
justified his actions by a broad reading of the constitutional powers of the
239. H.R. REP. No. 833, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence recommend prohibiting various classes of covert action such as "efforts to subvert democratic
governments" or assassinating foreign officials. Church Comm. Report supra note 90, at 448; see also
Lobel, supra note 26 (suggesting prohibiting executive-sponsored paramilitary action undertaken
without congressional approval).
240. Congressional Oversight of Covert Activities: Hearings Before the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 98tH Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983).
241. The framers' judgment, still relevant today, was that the Constitution ought to make military
intervention difficult, even if the intervention was to be undertaken by foreigners with our aid. Lobel,
supra note 26; see Halperin, Lawful Wars, 72 FOREIGN POL'Y 173 (1988).
242. See THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 810 (T. Fain, K. Plant & R. Milloy eds. 1977). The
Committee's proposal was not enacted.
243. 121 CONG. REc. 276456 (Sept. 4, 1975).
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President and a narrow reading of the Boland Amendment, he also raised
the national emergency exception to the rule of law. 44
The answer, however, is not to yield virtually unlimited constitutional
power to the President-a position which itself undermines the rule of
law-but to rethink the current search for domination leading to ever pre-
sent crisis, to reject a foreign policy based upon an ever present world-
wide communist threat. In that context, the liberal approach would again
serve the function of providing a legal device to separate emergency power
from the normal foreign affairs powers of the government.
D. Beyond The Liberal Model of Emergency Powers
The current crisis of liberalism reflects, in part, the transitional age in
which we live-an era caught between the traditional nation-state system
and the increasing interdependence of the international community.245 In
a transformative era, the shortcomings of the traditional approach will
often be perceived, yet alternative visions will either not be clear or appear
utopian.
To the extent it is possible to look beyond the short-term solutions of
the liberal model, a transformative vision must insist on two very differ-
ent, but complementary changes from our present situation. The first
would be the further development of the international system of govern-
ance, supplementing nation-states and simultaneously weakening the "us-
versus-them" perspective that characterizes the present nation state sys-
244. North testified that he had lied to Congress in order to save lives. 0. NORTH, TAKING THE
STAND 256 (1988). His secretary, Fawn Hall, apparently subscribed to Jefferson's position that
sometimes one must go above the written law. Similarly, it is unclear whether the FEMA plan was
perceived as a constitutional suspension of rights or an extra-constitutional, emergency suspension of
the Constitution itself. The key difference between the traditional, liberal-Jeffersonian approach and
Oliver North's defense, lies in Jefferson's clear requirement that in taking emergency action in dero-
gation of law, the executive must openly defend such action and seek congressional and public ap-
proval. North, in contrast, acted secretly to avoid public or congressional scrutiny. M. Briand, Civil
Disobedience: The Missing Defense for Iran-Contra Activists, L.A. Daily J., June 30, 1987, at 4, col.
1. Moreover, for Jefferson and Madison such emergency action was exceptional, confined to the grav-
est national emergencies, while North's claim would make the exception applicable to virtually any
national security crisis perceived by the executive.
Former Attorney General Meese has also recently relied on Locke's executive preogative to justify
broad presidential power. Meese, supra note 135, at 226-27. Meese, unlike Jefferson, argues that
"under our Constitution, the executive can exercise the power that Locke envisioned and stay within
the law." Id.
245. As Richard Falk has suggested, the inability of the present political, economic, and legal
orders to deal successfully with the challenges faced by an increasingly integrated world resembles the
inability of feudalism and medievalism to solve the problems of Europe from the fourteenth to seven-
teenth centuries. Falk, Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law & Future Prospects, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 410 (1980). See also INTERNATIONAL LAW, A CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE 7 (R. Falk, F. Katochuil & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1985) (describing this juncture in international
relations as a Grotian moment).
The present inability of the old liberal paradigm to provide solutions to a wide variety of constitu-
tional problems has led many scholars to reject the model entirely. See, e.g., LIBERALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 125-265 (M. Sandel ed. 1984) (essays criticizing liberal models); POLITICS OF LAW, A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363
(1984).
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tem. The second change would involve reviving communalist politics, in
which the citizenry, often acting through local communities, plays a more
active role in determining our relations with peoples of other nations.
Both changes undermine the liberal system's basis in distinct national
rules: one by internationalizing government, the other by localizing it and
making the citizenry into active participants in the decisionmaking
process.
These changes would supplement and ultimately transform traditional
separation of power restraints. The constitutional restraints on the execu-
tive are the product of a fear of unilateral decisionmaking by any one
person. In an effective multinational system, unilateral United States ex-
ecutive power would be restrained by international political and legal
processes. Moreover, active citizen and local participation in foreign-
policy making would reduce the power of the centralized government, ren-
dering unrestrained executive adventurism less likely. The legal restraints
currently provided horizontally within the national government by separa-
tion of powers would be supplemented by vertical restraints imposed by
international society and popular community pressures.
In addition, these changes would undermine one important basis of the
emergency/normalcy dichotomy-the fear of other peoples. Liberal society
has traditionally addressed that fear by seeking to remove it physically by
isolating ourselves, and constitutionally by separating emergency power
from the normal constitutional order.24 Increased people-to-people rela-
tions between American communities and other societies is likely to
change the perspective that views the other as the enemy, as will the de-
velopment of a more multinational governmental structure. As Louis
Hartz has noted, "the larger forces working toward a shattering of Ameri-
can provincialism" require "nothing less than a new level of conscious-
ness, a transcending of irrational Lockianism, in which an understanding
of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand.124 7 While tension
and strains would still exist with other countries, such tensions could be
resolved without resort to an "emergency" paradigm.
The resulting normative vision would probably rely more on commu-
nity interaction and less on fixed rules to govern our lives. Situations
would be categorized not as emergency or non-emergency, but by their
particular characteristics.2 48 Eschewing a reliance on fixed rules to order
246. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
247. L. HARTZ, supra note 55, at 308.
248. The approach outlined above shares some of the attributes of the fluid legal realist perspec-
tive on foreign affairs decisionmaking. The key differences lies in both the context of and the actors
involved in such an 'interactive' approach.
In the context of current United States foreign policy, the legal realist model results in the weaken-
ing of constitutional restraints on the executive and the relative absence of effective alternative re-
straints. In a transformed international and domestic context, a contextual, less rule-oriented approach
would rely on international governmental cooperation and popular participation in international af-
fairs to provide a multifaceted series of restraints on "emergency" power. Moreover, a new contextual
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our lives requires decisionmaking that focuses on the particular conse-
quences of the concrete alternative possibilities in discrete situations.249
Such a contextual approach views experience as concrete and multifaceted
rather than universal and binary.250
The possibility of these transformations lies within the shadows of the
present.251 While the bright hopes of a world government that accompa-
nied the establishment of the United Nations have faded, Gorbachev's new
perspectives, the increasing interdependence of the world's economies, and
awareness of the vulnerability of the global environment have renewed
interest in multilateral institutions and cooperative approaches. In addi-
tion, the revival of scholarly interest in citizenry participation in govern-
ment 52 has proceeded apace with an actual revival of citizen participation
in foreign affairs issues. Localities have begun passing resolutions on for-
eign policy issues, adopting sister cities in other parts of the world, and
actively refusing to cooperate with emergency plans proposed by such
agencies as FEMA.253 Citizens across the country have engaged in acts of
civil disobedience to display their disapproval of policies in Central
America. 2  Anti-nuclear activists have also taken to the streets and jails to
protest the United States' continuation of the nuclear arms race. These
citizen and community movements contain two important transformative
aspects. First, they do provide some concrete, democratic restraint on exec-
utive usurpation of power. Secondly, by directly interacting with people
whom we have been taught to fear and distrust, these movements help
approach would have to be premised on a substantive reduction of the fear of other peoples that
underlies the liberal model. The cooperation envisioned would not be merely between branches of
government in order to combat foreign threats, but between communities of different nations to solve
common problems.
249. Mazor, The Crisis of Liberal Legalism, 81 YALE L.J. 1032, 1052-53 (1972). See also T.
May, Psychology, Knowledge, Politics: The Epistemic Grounds of Michael Foucault's Genealogy of
Psychology ch. 7 (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (interpreting Foucault's
micropolitical approach).
250. Professor Michelman argues that much of our constitutional dialogue occurs outside the for-
mal channels of electoral and legislative politics: for example, in town meetings, voluntary organiza-
tions, and local government agencies. "Those are all arenas of potentially transformative dialogue."
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988). To citizen activists of the last few
decades, law is not merely the positivistic command of the sovereign, but a product of the community's
experiences and values that they articulate. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos & Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1983) (law stems from community). That different vision
of law as deriving from community interaction is more multidimensional and particularized than the
traditional binary model of liberal thought.
251. Falk, The Grotian Quest, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 245, at 36.
252. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY FOR A NEW AGE (1984);
see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 250; Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175
(1986); Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1623 (1988).
253. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y 154 (Winter
1987).
254. See Falk, Introduction, in BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1987).
1432 [Vol. 98: 1385
Emergency Power
break down the fears upon which the emergency/normalcy dichotomy is
premised.
While these efforts are on the margin of current mainstream thought on
foreign affairs, one commentator argues that the "shift from pre- to post-
transformation practice is more like a movement from margin to center-a
shift of attention-than it is like a total replacement of one 'world' by
another." '255 Such a perspective describes the shift from the liberal view to
the relativist view in the twentieth century; possibly the current citizen's
movement will move from the margin to the center in the twenty-first
century.
The struggle to revive the dichotomies of liberal thought is therefore
contradictory. On the one hand, the separation of experience into oppo-
sites allows for the development of neutral rules and political democracy.
Unlike the situation existing in the Middle Ages, or under fascist govern-
ment, liberalism's separation of spheres allows for the relegation of totali-
tarian, arbitrary government to discrete crisis periods. The weakening of
these dichotomies raises a grave danger of authoritarian rule in the con-
duct of foreign affairs. For any restoration of the dichotomies to attempt to
remedy this situation, the sense of continual, permanent crisis must be
eliminated.
However, the changing global and domestic context presents a possibil-
ity for transforming the liberal model by providing international and com-
munalist restraints on governmental power. Such a solution would at-
tempt to overcome the fears that lead to the necessity for emergency
power, instead of merely limiting emergency power by means of legal
rules. We must seek to revive the dichotomies of liberal thought, yet rec-
ognize that the restriction of emergency powers ultimately requires the
abandonment of the dualistic model.
255. Michelman, supra note 250, at 1523.
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